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The People's Republic of China and Great Britain have set
a precedent in negotiating the peaceful return of Hong Kong's
sovereignty and administration to China. This thesis examines
the political, economic and social forces operating within
China, Hong Kong and Great Britain to determine the future
success of the Joint Declaration in maintaining Hong Kong's
stability and economic prosperity. It also investigates the
commitment of all three parties to the future success of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) . Although
optimistic about the success of the Hong Kong SAR, it
recognizes the need for continued pragmatism and restraint
by Beijing and Hong Kong. The Hong Kong people must be
committed to maintaining the SAR's independence by avoiding
any radical changes in their political or social systems that
would threaten their prosperity and stability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The retrocession of Hong Kong to China in 1997 is a
significant historical and political event with wide ranging
impact upon the future prosperity and security of the region.
Its significance goes beyond the simple return of territory
to the People's Republic of China. Instead, it has regional
and global implications. While this retrocession redresses
three of the remaining "unequal treaties," it poses a serious
challenge to China: the successful management of Hong Kong
ensuring its economic prosperity and vitality. The Joint
Declaration on Hong Kong establishes the legal framework for
continued prosperity and stability in Hong Kong to the year
2047 under Chinese leadership. Importantly, this declaration
with its three annexes makes up a legally binding formal
international agreement. It is an agreement ratified by both
countries and committing them to the future of Hong Kong.
The peaceful transfer of sovereignty from the United
Kingdom to the PRC promised in the Joint Declaration is
important to all sides. The future prosperity of Hong Kong
cannot be guaranteed without the preservation of Hong Kong's
unique freedoms, legal system and way of life. China has
Great Britain, Foreign Office, Draft Agreement between
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic
of China on the Future of Hong Kong~| 26 September 1984, p. 5
.
promised to maintain Hong Kong's rights and freedom until
2047. The Joint Declaration states:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government
shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for
by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including
freedom of speech, of the press, of correspondence, of
travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of
choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief,
inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and the
right to raise a family freely.
2
These promises are wide-ranging, comprehensive and essential
for the maintenance of investor confidence in the future.
China's greatest source of foreign exchange is Hong Kong,
with estimates varying from twenty-five to forty percent of
3China's total foreign exchange earnings. If Hong Kong is to
continue producing such high levels of foreign exchange,
investors and manufacturers must have confidence in the
stability of the Hong Kong market.
Hong Kong has one of the finest harbors in the Orient.
This makes it well suited for the entrepot role in Southern
China. The British established Hong Kong as a commercial
center for British operations in China after the Opium War
(1842). Hong Kong's economic importance declined after the
opening of China and the development of Shanghai as the com-
mercial and manufacturing center of China and by the late
1880 's it had been eclipsed by Shanghai. Hong Kong remained
2
Ibid., p. 23
Lucian W. Pye, "The International Position of Hong Kong,"
The China Quarterly 95 (September 1983): 461.
competitive due to its excellent geographic location on the
trade routes and the security and stability guaranteed by
British rule. This security promoted Hong Kong's development
as the commercial headquarters of the major British and
Western trading firms and the growth of a Chinese community
adept at business and trade. Shipping and commerce under
both the Europeans and the Chinese in Hong Kong ensured the
colony's continued success as an entrepot of China.
After the collapse of the Nationalist Government and the
victory of the Chinese Communists, Hong Kong regained its
position as the premier entrep&t and commercial center for
the China trade. Since 1949, Hong Kong has developed into
a major manufacturing center as well as entrepot. The value
of its goods and services has increased significantly since
then and was worth $31.9 Billion (U.S.) in 1984. There is
no reason why this should alter significantly with the return
of Hong Kong to China. Hong Kong's goods and services will
still demand a share of the international market, thus contin-
uing to earn foreign exchange for China. China will continue
to earn a large portion of its foreign exchange through Hong
Kong and will acquire experienced international businessmen
and technicians needed to help guide China's modernization
program. Following the retrocession of Hong Kong, China must
practice moderation and self-restraint and abide by the Joint
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Economic
Report (April 1985): 2.
Declaration if it is to retain the support and confidence
of the Hong Kong business community. It is expected that
Hong Kong's major role in the development and modernization
of China will be as the major entrepot of China. Hong Kong
surpasses all other Chinese ports with its highly developed
port facilities, transportation system, communications and
financial facilities.
China, the United States and Japan have considerable
economic interests in Hong Kong. They trade and invest heavily
with the territory and are responsible for fifty-five percent
of Hong Kong's trade. This investment commits them to its
future prosperity. This commitment could change over time,
especially with the quick amortization of investment in Hong
Kong, but the trend appears to be increasing rather than de-
creasing. There has been continued growth in both trade and
investment since 1982 and especially since the signing of the
Joint Declaration, thus demonstrating renewed investor confi-
dence in Hong Kong's future. There is good reason for this
confidence, the history of Hong Kong since 1949 has demonstrated
Hong Kong's external trade figures for the U.S., P.R.C.,
and Japan in 1984, (all figures in U.S. dollars):
Total trade with U.S.: $12.5 Billion; Imports from U.S.:
$3,125 Billion; Domestic Exports to U.S.: $7.87 Billion;
Re-exports to U.S.: $1.53 Billion;
Total Trade with PRC : $10.9 Billion; Imports from PRC:
$7.15 Billion; Domestic Exports to PRC: $1.45 Billion;
Re-exports to PRC: $2.31 Billion;
Total Trade with Japan: $8.0 Billion; Imports from Japan:-
$6.75 Billion; Domestic exports to Japan: $0.66 Billion;
Re-exports to Japan: $0.59 Billion; from Hong Kong, Census $
Statistics Department, Hong Kong in Figures, 1985 ed., p. 3.
10
the CCP's restraint and determination in maintaining Hong
Kong's prosperity to the mutual benefit of China and Hong
Kong.
There are several questions that must be answered
regarding the retrocession of Hong Kong to the People's
Republic of China. These questions include: 1) What will
the future hold for Hong Kong under the Joint Declaration?
2) Will the PRC abide by the provisions of the Joint
Declaration? and 3) Will the PRC allow Hong Kong to govern
itself within the framework of the Joint Declaration without
interference? To answer these questions this thesis will
examine the political, economic and social forces operating
within China, Hong Kong and Great Britain. It will also
investigate the commitment of all three parties to the future
success and prosperity of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.
11
II. HONG KONG UNDER THE UNEQUAL TREATIES
Hong Kong grew from a small, sparsely populated island
in the Pearl River estuary into a teeming international center
of commerce and manufacturing. Foreign Secretary Lord
Palmerston, who opposed the seizure of Hong Kong, described
it contemptuously as "a barren island with hardly a house
upon it," in his dispatch to Captain Elliot on 21 April 1841.
Palmerston' s low regard for Hong Kong led to Elliot's recall
7
and disgrace. Over the next one hundred and forty years the
territory grew not only in wealth and importance but in size,
both in area and population. Hong Kong's success under the
British created greater demand for more land for development
and protection. This land was acquired through a combination
of military coercion and diplomacy.
The Royal Navy under Sir Gordon Bremer seized Hong Kong
Island on 26 January 1841 and proclaimed British sovereignty
o
under the aborted Convention of Chuenpi. The Qing Court
formally ceded the island to Great Britain in Article III
of the Treaty of Nanking, (Appendix A), marking the end of
the Opium War and the beginning of British administration.
George B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London:
Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 18.
7
John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China





Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 17, 25.
12
The first expansion of Hong Kong's territory was during
the Second Sino-British War. Harry Smith Parkes, one of the
Anglo-French Commissioners in Guangzhou, negotiated a lease
on behalf of the British Government, of the Kowloon peninsula
with the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces
q
on 20 March 1860 (Appendix B) . This lease was superseded
by Article VI of the Convention of Peking signed 24 October
1860 (Appendix C) . The Convention of Peking ceded the
Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters Island to Great Britain
for incorporation into the Colony of Hong Kong.
Pressure from military and commercial interests for con-
tinued growth and expansion of Hong Kong's territory became
extremely strong by the 1890's. In 1898, these interests
succeeded in extending Hong Kong's boundaries with the
signing of the Convention Respecting an Extension of the
Hong Kong Territory (Appendix D) . This Convention is commonly
known as the New Territories Lease, and it expires 1 July
1997. The New Territories make up approximately ninety
percent of the total land area of the territory, and since
December 1899 have been an integral part of the Colony of
Hong Kong.
Edgar Holt, The Opium Wars in China (London: Putnam
and Company, Ltd., 1964), p. 253; Hong Kong, Laws, Statutes,
etc., Laws of Hong Kong 1964 ed., vol. 24, Appendix IV, p. Fl
Endacott, A History of Hong Kong
,
p. 110.
n Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty 1898-1997 (Hong Kong:
Oxoford University Press, 1980), pp. 11-28.
13
These three treaties constitute the United Kingdom's
claim to territorial sovereignty over Hong Kong. The People's
Republic of China repudiates all of them as unequal treaties
and thus null and void, but chooses to maintain the status
quo until the time is ripe for change. The expiration of
the New Territories Lease provided Britain and China the
opportunity to change Hong Kong's status. The retrocession
of Hong Kong was agreed upon during the Sino-British negoti-
ations in 1984. China will assume sovereignty and adminis-
tration of Hong Kong in accordance with the Joint Declaration
on the Future of Hong Kong. To understand the British and
Chinese positions it is necessary to examine each of the
treaties
.
A. TREATY OF NANKING
Hong Kong was established by the British during the Opium
War of 1839-1842. This experience demonstrated to them the
necessity for a British colony on the China coast that could
serve as an enclave protected from the vagaries of Chinese
politics. British colonial interests, including the opium
traders, needed a secure base of operations for their Chinese
coastal operations. Their superior military and naval forces
were able to force the cession of Hong Kong Island in
perpetuity in the Treaty of Nanking.
The Opium War resulted from misperceptions and growing
hostilities on both sides. British and American merchants
14
trading in Canton began selling opium in the late 1700's as
a means of generating capital needed to purchase Chinese goods,
especially tea and silks. By the 1830's, the volume of the
opium trade had exceeded the level of exports resulting in a
perceived silver drain on the Chinese economy. This per-
ception was coupled with the perceptions of the Chinese
bureaucracy that China did not need to trade with anyone and
that all foreigners should come to China as supplicants and
not equals. The British contributed to this problem. Their
merchants persisted in trading in opium, not only in Canton
12but along the entire South China coast. The end of the
British East India Company's monopoly created even more prob-
lems for Chinese officials who desired one representative
to deal with. The British Government appointed a series of
officials who refused to deal with the Chinese officials with
flattery, bribery and humility that was expected. Instead
the British officials demanded treatment as equals and
representatives of one sovereign to another.
After seizing Hong Kong Island and declaring British
sovereignty on 26 January 1841 under the terms of the
Convention of Chuenpi, the British began developing Hong Kong
as the center of British merchant operations in the Far East.
Although Captain Elliot was recalled to Britain in disgrace,
his replacement, Sir Henry Pottinger, enthusiastically
12 Fairbank, pp. 66-71
15
supported the occupation and development of Hong Kong despite
Lord Palmerston' s low opinion of the island's value as a
13future base for British Far Eastern operations. Pottinger
succeeded in extracting the Treaty of Nanking from the Qing
Imperial Commissioner Yi j ing after a series of military
operations that threatened the security of Nanking.
The Treaty of Nanking ended the Opium War between China
and Great Britain. This treaty also granted several other
concessions to Britain besides the ceding of Hong Kong.
These concessions included the opening of five treaty ports
to British trade, the abolition of the co-hong system of trade
and the payment of an indemnity of twenty-one million silver
dollars. It also started the process of altering the
traditional basis for Chinese foreign relations. In theory,
foreign states were to be treated as equals and not tributary
states
.
B. CONVENTION OF PEKING
The need for a new treaty between China and Great Britain
became obvious shortly after the signing of the Treaty of
Nanking. The Treaty of Nanking, while granting the British
13 Endacott, A History of Hong Kong
,
pp. 19-21.
14 Ibid., pp. 21-22; Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers,
The Far East: A History of Western Impacts and Eastern
Responses, 1830-1975
,
6th ed., (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
Prentice Hall, Inc. , 1975), p. 84.
China, Inspectorate General of Customs, The Maritime
Customs, Treaties, Conventions, Etc., between China and
Foreign States
,
vol. 1, 2d ed.
,
(Shanghai: Inspectorate
General of Customs, 1917), pp. 351-356.
16
greater freedom along the China coast, did not satisfy the
needs of the British merchants and officials. Both groups
wanted the legalization of the opium trade, protection from
the vagaries of Chinese officials, greater access to the
interior of China and diplomatic representation at the Qing
Court. The Treaty of the Bogue (1843) settled several of
the trade problems and granted extraterritoriality, but it
did not resolve the major problems.
Demands for change increased during the 1850 's as
xenophobia and anti-foreign acts increased in Guangzhou. Ye
Mingchen, the Governor-General of Guangdong inflamed anti-
foreign sentiments among the Cantonese and incited attacks
upon the British. The rising tide of xenophobia led to
the trial and execution of a French priest at Silin in mid-
1856, a direct violation of the Imperial edicts of 1844 and
1846 promising toleration towards Christian missionaries in
17China. Matters were made worse by the Chinese seizure of
the L orcha Arrow, a British-registered Hong Kong Chinese-owned
boat in violation of the Treaty of the Bogue. Britain and
France used these incidents to start hostilities against
China for the purpose of gaining further concessions in a
new treaty.
16 Fairbank, pp. 277-279.
17Holt, pp. 192-193.
17
By 1858, all parties had agreed upon the terms of the
Treaty of Tientsin but the Chinese refusal to allow its
ratification in Beijing forced a second phase to the Second
Sino-British War. A large Anglo-French force assembled in
Hong Kong and in October 1860, entered Beijing as conquerors.
The Convention of Peking ended the conflict and forced
further concessions from the Chinese.
The growth of Hong Kong as the center of British trade
and shipping in the Far East, and the steady influx of Chinese
laborers and merchants, led to the need for more land. This
need became even more apparent during the assemblage of the
Anglo-French invasion force in 1860. The British Commissioner
in Guangzhou, Harry Smith Parkes, negotiated a perpetual lease
of the Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters Island with the
Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces on 20
March 1860. Article VI of the Convention of Peking superceded
the lease by ceding the territory to Great Britain for incor-
poration into the Colony of Hong Kong. The Convention of
Peking also confirmed the provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin
(1858), in which Article I reaffirmed the validity of the
Treaty of Nanking. Thus the Chinese recognized and affirmed
the British possession of Hong Kong Island.
C. NEW TERRITORIES LEASE
Between 1860 and 1898 Hong Kong prospered and developed
into the headquarters of Western commercial trade in East
18
Asia and as the entrepot of China. Shipping and commerce
expanded as the volume of Asian trade grew. Hong Kong became
the major stopping point for repairs and stores as well as
18the largest transshipment point on the China coast.
The growth and prosperity of Hong Kong contributed to the
pressure for expansion of the colony's boundaries. The mil-
itary felt that Hong Kong could not be defended if they did
not control the islands and mainland overlooking the Colony
19
and the harbor entrances. The commercial interests desired
less interference from the Chinese authorities in Kowloon
and the removal of the Chinese customs depots to facilitate
20the smuggling of opium within extended boundaries. These
two special interests groups were operating within the context
of Britain's overall policy of attempting to maintain the
territorial integrity of China against the efforts of Japan,
Russia, Germany and France to acquire its territory. China
had become more adept at foreign policy and international
21law but was still susceptible to gunboat diplomacy. The
combination of military and commercial interests in Hong Kong,
1 8
George B. Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot (London: Her
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1964), pp. ix-xv.
19Wesley-Smith, pp. 11-15.
20 Ibid., pp. 18-20.
21Anthony Dicks, "Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance?
Some Legal Aspects of the Status of Hong Kong," The China
Quarterly 95 (September 1983): 447-448; Wesley-Smith,
pp . 21- 28 .
19
and the imperialist competition in China, gave Britain the
opportunity and justification for extending Hong Kong's
boundaries
.
The Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong
Territory was negotiated and signed in Beijing on 9 June 1898.
This treaty increased Hong Kong's land area by 365.5 square
miles and guaranteed continued Chinese jurisdiction within
the city of Kowloon. The lease's terms were for ninety-nine
years, terminating at midnight 30 June 1997. On 20 October
1898, the British Court issued an Order in Council which
incorporated the leased territory, with the exception of the
city of Kowloon, into the Colony of Hong Kong. Fifteen months
later an Order in Council was issued that took away Chinese
jurisdiction in the city of Kowloon stating that it had been
"found to be inconsistent with the military requirements for
22the defence of Hong Kong." These actions bound the New
Territories to the ceded portions of Hong Kong thus making
it extremely difficult to give up the lease without affecting
all of Hong Kong.
The integration of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New
Territories into a single entity makes it impossible to
separately return the New Territories to China. The leased
lands have become extremely important to the operation and
survival of the Crown Colony. It makes up ninety percent of
22 Godfrey E. P. Hertslet, Hertslet ' s China Treaties vol
2, (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1908), p. 750
20
Hong Kong's total land mass and has become the major
resettlement area in Government efforts to relieve urban
congestion.
In 1982, the impending expiration of the New Territories
lease forced the United Kingdom to open negotiations with
the People's Republic of China on the future of Hong Kong.
The British and the Chinese realized it would be impossible
to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong if its
territorial integrity were disturbed. Britain realized that
China would not renew the lease, and without a valid lease
after 1997 it would be bound to return the leased lands to
China without any agreement safeguarding the future of the
territory.
21
III. CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS HONG KONG (1949-1980)
The People's Republic of China has maintained a tolerant
and pragmatic position towards Hong Kong and the British role
in administering the territory since the Communist victory
in 1949. There have been periodic spurts of unrest and
turmoil in the 1950' s and 1960's, but they were controlled
and kept limited in scope by both the CCP leadership and the
Hong Kong authorities. The riots of 1956 and 1967, while
covered exhaustively by the world press, did not affect the
colony's economic performance. In fact, productivity and
trade increased ten percent in August 1967, the height of
23Communist agitation. As Hong Kong moved into the 1970's,
China increased its economic role in Hong Kong expanding into
the industrial and retail sectors, as well as banking, so that
by 1984, Chinese investment in Hong Kong was estimated at
three to four billion U.S. dollars. This investment position
gives the Chinese a large stake in maintaining Hong Kong's
prosperity and stability.
The Communists were not the first to call for an end to
the Unequal Treaties. Sun Yat-sen spoke against them and
23
"Communists unable to halt Hongkong's economic growth,"
Times (London), 15 September 1967, p. 24.
24 United States, Consulate General Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Investment Statement, 23 November 1984, p. 4.
22
Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in getting the United States and
Great Britain to relinquish their special rights in China.
Britain refused to give up its claim to Hong Kong but in the
midst of World War II it did, along with the United States,
give up extraterritoriality, the right to station troops in
25China and all other land rights in China.
The official Chinese position on Hong Kong was that it
is a "problem left over by history" that should be resolved
peacefully when the time is ripe. This position was reit-
erated several times over the past forty years from Mao
Zedong's statement in 1959 that China was in no "hurry to
take it back" to the official pronouncements on Hong Kong in
27late September 1982. As the PRC became more involved
economically in Hong Kong during the 1970 's and Anglo-Chinese
relations were normalized in 1972, China softened its stand
on Hong Kong by 1979. These moves opened the door to the
Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong.
This chapter will look at Chinese policy toward Hong Kong,
how this policy has changed over the last forty years and how
2 5Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny (New York: Roy
Publishers, 1947), pp. 151-154.
26Huang Hua, United Nations, Letter Dated 8 March 1972 ,
(U.N. Document A/AC. 109/396).
? 7
Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., Hong Kong In Search of a Future
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 45; Christopher
Wren, "China Calls Hong Kong Pacts Invalid," New York Times ,
1 October 1982, p. 3.
23
this change ushered in the peaceful resolution of the Hong
Kong problem.
A. THE 1950's and 1960's
These decades were turbulent in China but they did not
affect Hong Kong's growth and development. The domestic
turmoil in China temporarily spilled over into Hong Kong in
1956 and 1967. The unrest generated by the Chinese Communist
Party in Hong Kong was quickly quelled in 1956 and silenced
by midsummer in 1967. For the sake of foreign exchange
earnings, the central leadership of the CCP appeared committed
to keeping Hong Kong free of the violence and turmoil suffered
by the rest of China.
Hong Kong changed dramatically during this time period.
The Korean War and the embargo of China by the Western world
forced Hong Kong to change from China's entrepot into a "Newly
28Industrializing Country" (NIC). The industrialization of
Hong Kong was assisted by two factors, the flight of capital
out of China and the flood of Chinese refugees escaping to
Hong Kong. These factors combined in Hong Kong to produce a
dynamic business environment. The cheap labor and ready
capital and expertise led to the growth of Hong Kong's textile
and clothing industry, electronics assembly and other light
industries. Much of this industrialization could not have
28Melinda J. Parsons, ed., Hong Kong 1984 (Hong Kong:





been accomplished if it had not been for the New Territories
lease which gave Hong Kong the land necessary for industrial-
ization and housing for the flood of refugees.
The 1956 riots were the result of clashes between
Communist and Kuomingtang supporters during the October First
and "Double Ten" celebrations. The demonstrators changed the
focus of their attacks from each other to all foreigners in
the colony. The Hong Kong authorities moved quickly against
the demonstrators and the major disorders were suppressed
29by midnight on 11 October 1956. The riots and the British
response brought about Chinese charges that the British were
allowing anti-Communist (KMT) elements to agitate and provoke
China. After the 1956 riots Premier Zhou Enlai warned Britain
that China would not ignore or allow such disturbances in
30
the future. This episode demonstrated to the British the
need for closer surveillance of possible troublemakers,
including KMT agents and Chinese gangsters, and a quicker
response to trouble so as to avoid any possibility of inter-
vention by China.
The 1967 riots were the result of spillover from the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. The heaviest anti-
British rioting in Hong Kong occurred in May and June 1967,
"3,000 Arrested in Hongkong after Riots," Times (London),
15 October 1956, p. 8; "Secret Societies' Part in Riots," Times
(London), 17 October 1956, p. 8.
30
"Chou Cautions British on Hong Kong Rioting," New York
Times, 15 Ocotber 1956, p. 6.
25
corresponding with the height of the Cultural Revolution.
Disturbances started in March over labor disputes which became
politicized after pro -Communist and pro-Nationalist workers
clashed. The lack of concrete direction from Beijing led to
the radicalization of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong
Kong and an increase in rioting and violence in May and June.
It is often charged that the outside support for the rioters
in Hong Kong came from the Communists in Guangzhou, under
the leadership of the party notable Tao Zhu.
The Guangzhou-backed riots in Hong Kong failed to succeed
in overturning British rule in the colony for several reasons.
The Communist Party was divided into four factions, a moderate
political faction associated with Premier Zhou Enlai; another
with ties to the disgraced party leader of Guangdong province,
Tao Zhu; a third faction made up of moderate Chinese merchants
and bankers linked to the Chinese leadership; and a fourth
consisting of the trade unions under the leadership of Yeung
31Kwang and Fei Yi Min. This lack of unity helped to splinter
the efforts of the Hong Kong CCP and provided the Hong Kong
Government and police an opportunity to counter their efforts
without alienating the majority of Hong Kong people. The
rise of the radical Red Guard- inspired trade union faction
in Hong Kong and the incidents at the Hong Kong-China border
strengthened the British stand against the radicals.
David Bonavia, "Strikes called in Hongkong," Times
(London), 24 May 1967, p. 5; "Communists at odds in Hongkong,"
Times (London), 30 September 1967, p. 3.
26
The British were able to limit the scope of the strikes
and effectively stopped them before they became too
destructive to the economy. One action was the firing of
striking workers and the hiring of replacements by both the
32Government and private firms. The PRC, aware of Hong Kong's
value as a foreign exchange earner, did not wish to suffer a
severe financial hardship by losing their Hong Kong market
for farm produce and other export goods. This was demonstrated
when the PRC refused to abide by the food stoppage strike
beyond a token one day stoppage of deliveries that did not
affect food supplies in Hong Kong. The Chinese did however
refuse to start water delivery early despite a critical water
33
shortage in Hong Kong.
Beijing eventually reacted to the economic unrest and
lack of genuine progress in disrupting the British adminis-
tration in Hong Kong. In late May 1967 it was reported that
the CCP sent an emissary to Hong Kong to rebuke the local CCP
leaders for their inept tactics. This was followed by a
directive published in People's Daily which called upon the
Hong Kong Communist Party to unify and change its tactics in
32
"More lose jobs in Hongkong," Times (London), 13 June
1967, p. 5.
33
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35preparation for the future. Despite the turmoil in China,
the Chinese leadership felt it necessary to safeguard the
prosperity of Hong Kong by stopping future rioting.
B. THE 1970's
Hong Kong continued to prosper and develop throughout the
1970's. This growth was linked to the state of Sino-American
and Sino-British relations. The Vietnam War had helped to
fuel Hong Kong's industrialization, but it took the thaw in
Sino-American relations in 1972 to spark a resurgence of
entrepot trade between China and the West through Hong Kong.
Normalization of Sino-British relations helped to expand
Hong Kong's entrepot role and promoted the growth of Hong
Kong's international business community. Hong Kong emerged
from this decade as China's major entrepot and a major center
of Asian-Pacific finance.
China increased its investment in Hong Kong during the
1970's. The Chinese expanded their retail and banking oper-
ations. They also invested in various Hong Kong companies
involved in land development and light industry. By 1980
there were thirteen Chinese State-Controlled Banks in Hong
Kong offering a full range of financial services. These banks,
as a consortium, overtook the Chartered Bank as the second
35 David Bonavia, "Peking's Call to Hongkong Youth," Times
(London), 6 July 1967, p. 5.
A.J. Youngson, China and Hong Kong: The Economic Nexus





37largest banking group in Hong Kong. China succeeded in
establishing itself as a major financial presence in Hong
Kong. Looking to increase the volume of exports, China
established a year-round trading presence in Hong Kong
ranging from the national China Resources Corporation to the
provincial Fu j ian Enterprises Company Ltd. These agents are
responsible for expanding the market for Chinese products to
increase the level of foreign exchange earnings. Hong Kong's
entrepot facilities give China the flexibility needed to
expand this trade regardless of the political orientation of
the buying nation (i.e. Taiwan and the Republic of Korea).
Early in 1972, China restated its position on Hong Kong
and Macau. Huang Hua, in a letter to the United Nations
Special Committee on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and People, stated that Hong Kong and Macau should
not be considered, the question of Hong Kong and Macau was a
matter of Chinese sovereignty that would be resolved "when
38
conditions are ripe."
Great Britain and China normalized relations on 13 March
39
1972 and upgraded the British mission in Beijing to an Embassy.
37 Ibid., pp. 31-36.
58 Huang Hua, United Nations, Letter Dated 8 March 1972
(U.N. Document A/AC. 109/396)
39Alvin Shuster, "London
Taiwan Offices," New York Times , 14 March 1972, p. 1.
in Peking Accord; To Close
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Britain had been one of the first countries to recognize the
People's Republic of China after the Communist victory in
1949. Disputes over Taiwan and the Korean Conflict had
prevented the formal exchange of ambassadors. The 1972
breakthrough opened the door to greater cooperation and ties
between Hong Kong and China.
C. SETTING THE STAGE FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Hong Kong-PRC relations changed significantly during the
1970' s. Three significant changes in China's attitude toward
Hong Kong were seen in 1979. Premier Hua Guofeng gave a press
conference on 7 October 1979 in which he outlined the new
Chinese position. He recognized the legality of British
authority in Hong Kong; the need to protect investors
interests in Hong Kong; and the acceptability of negotiations
41
to resolve the 1997 problem. The recognition of these
points by China set the stage for the Sino-British negotiations
China and Hong Kong began exchanging official visits and
notes in late 1978 when Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Li
Qiang visited Hong Kong in December 1978. During this visit
Li talked of Hong Kong's role in China's modernization. This
visit was followed by an official visit to China by the
40
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Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, in late March
1979. His eleven day visit provided the first direct talks
between the Chinese leadership in Beijing and the British
administration in Hong Kong.
Hua's assurances to Hong Kong investors demonstrated a
partial understanding of the complex dynamics of Hong Kong's
economy. China would have to recognize interests other than
its own and be willing to adopt pragmatic policies to
maintain the territory's prosperity and stability. Pledging
to protect investors was a first step towards maintaining
this stability and building China's credinility.
The third major point made by Hua was the recognition of
the need to negotiate a peaceful transfer of sovereignty. It
appeared that China was now willing to negotiate with the
United Kingdom in an attempt to maintain the territory's
economic prosperity.
China moved away from its traditional hard-line stand
toward Hong Kong and the Unequal Treaties. The Chinese
appeared ready to follow a pragmatic policy toward the 1997
problem. Their recognition of British rule in Hong Kong and
the need for negotiations established a criteria by which the
United Kingdom could open negotiations on the future of Hong
Kong.
Mary Lee, "Another step up the ladder," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 16 March 1979, pp. 36-37.
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IV. HONG KONG: SUBJECT OF SINO-BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong
began in 1982. Prior to actually negotiating, it was nec-
essary to establish the basic criteria for the negotiations.
This process had begun in the late 1970 's when China recognized
the legality of British authority in Hong Kong and the need
for negotiations to ensure the smooth transition of power
and maintain investor confidence. Britain responded to
these Chinese pronouncements in January 198 2 during the
meeting between Premier Zhao Ziyang and British Lord Privy
44Seal Humphrey Atkins. This meeting marked the start of
more than two and a half years of talks and negotiations on
the future of Hong Kong. After much propagandizing,
educating and cajoling the Joint Declaration was drafted and
initialed on 26 September 1984. The United Kingdom and China
had succeeded in drafting a working document that would attempt
to preserve Hong Kong's economic prosperity and vitality.
The negotiation process was hampered by British and
Chinese intransigence over the basic issues of sovereignty
43Clare Hollingworth, "Hua hints at stricter policing of
border," Daily Telegraph (London), 2 November 1979, p. 4;
Nigel Wade
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and future administration, which the Chinese insisted be
agreed upon prior to the start of substantive talks. The
Chinese insisted upon two major points: that the sovereignty
of Hong Kong belonged to China and that the expiration of the
lease in 1997 would mark the end of colonial rule not only in
the leased territory but the entire colony. The British
maintained that sovereignty of the ceded territories (Hong
Kong Island, Kowloon and Stonecutters Island) belonged to the
United Kingdom, and that there is a need for continued British
rule or guidance for the good of the people. All of these
problems existed under the shadow of impending seizure of the
territory by the People's Republic of China in 1997 and with
the understanding that Hong Kong was militarily indefensible,
having survived since 1949 at the sufference of the Chinese.
The negotiations went through several phases before
agreement on the Joint Declaration was reached. The Chinese
followed a pattern of negotiations with the British similar
45
to that seen in earlier negotiations with the United States.
The initial phase involved agreeing to negotiate. This was
pretty straight forward and took until late September 1982.
The next phase lasted from October 1982 to July 1983. In
this phase both sides attempted to establish an agenda and
procedures for future talks. The Chinese held up this phase
Derek Davies, "How Britain fell for the Peking game-
plan," Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 June 1984, pp. 44-45
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until the British agreed to recognize the Chinese position
on sovereignty. Officially the third phase, which involved
substantive negotiations, began on 12 July 1983, but progress
was not made until after the September 1983 economic crisis.
Up to that time the Chinese were attempting to apply pressure
upon the British to give up everything prematurely and the
British were attempting to teach the Chinese how and why the
Hong Kong system operated. It is important to remember that
the Chinese leadership mistrusted the United Kingdom. Deng
Xiaoping was also concerned about what history would say of
him and did not want to be remembered as another Li Hong- Jang.
As a member of the old revolutionary leadership, it was
important that he be remembered as the man who reunified
China and redressed the humiliation of China at the hands of
the British in the Nineteenth century.
Eight rounds of substantive talks were held between
October 1983 and mid-April 1984. In April, Sir Geoffrey Howe
revealed that the negotiators had reached agreement on the
basic framework of the Joint Declaration, but still had
several difficult issues to resolve. Negotiations continued
after the Howe visit and on 21 June 1984 a working group was
established to meet full time in Beijing. This group worked
six days a week hammering out the differences between the two
"Foreign Secretary Howe's Hong Kong Press Conference,"
FBIS China, 23 April 1984, pp. W1-W3.
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sides on the major problems. Most important of these was that
the agreement be balanced, secure and binding and not over-
ridden by the Basic Law, Hong Kong's future constitution.
Howe announced, after his second visit to Beijing in late
July, that a major breakthrough had been reached in the
negotiations based upon the British acceptance of China's
proposal for Special Administrative Region (SAR) status for
Hong Kong. The Chinese, feeling the pressure of their own
September deadline, agreed to the basic framework of an
agreement which would maintain Hong Kong's way of life and
47be legally binding. Negotiations continued on the remaining
unresolved issues after Howe's visit. An additional ad hoc
working group was established in Beijing on 24 August and both
sides continued pushing toward the September deadline. The
English and Chinese texts of the agreement, annexes and
memoranda were approved by the negotiators on 18 September
1984 and were initialed in Beijing by the Chief Negotiators,
British Ambassador to China Sir Richard Evans and Chinese
Vice-Foreign Minister Zhou Nan on 26 September. The Sino-
British Joint Declaration was finally signed on 19 December
1984 in Beijing by Premier Zhao Ziyang and Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher.
Emily Lau and Derek Davies, "Suddenly it's summer,"
Far Eastern Economic Review , 9 August 1985, pp. 10-14; "Howe
Holds News Conference on Talks with PRC," FBIS China , 1
1 August 1984, p. Wl.
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This chapter will examine the course of the Sino-British
negotiations in order to understand the dynamics involved
in reaching agreement of Hong Kong's future. It will also
trace the evolution of the key terms of the Joint Declaration.
B. THE OPENING ROUNDS
Time was running out for continued British rule in Hong
Kong by 1982. Business and commercial interests, both foreign
and domestic, began worrying about the future of the terri-
tory, especially in regards to the New Territory and the
legality of future land leases. It was obvious that the
Honk Kong Government could not continue leasing land in an
area that they would no longer control. These business
forces overruled those who preached for continued British
rule by ignoring the expiration of the New Territories lease,
while insisting upon the legitimacy of the Treaties of 1842
and 1860. This position would have violated international
law and weakened the United Kingdom's claim to have a say in
48determining the future of Hong Kong.
The United Kingdom opened the negotiations during the
meeting between Premier Zhao Ziyang and Lord Privy Seal
Humphrey Atkins on 6 January 1982. During this meeting, they
discussed the Hong Kong lease and the need for negotiations
to solve the various problems and issues raised when China
48 David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997 (Hong Kong: South China
Morning Post, 1983), p. 5.
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reasserts its sovereignty over the territory. Zhao reasserted
China's claim of sovereignty over all of Hong Kong but
expressed concern over maintaining its economic prosperity,
its status as a free port and as a center of international
49trade and finance. To accomplish the smooth transition of
power Zhao stated that joint UK-PRC discussions would be held
to arrive at "formal arrangements for Hong Kong's future
status." This meeting and the subsequent press releases
laid the groundwork for future negotiations on Hong Kong.
The September 1982 meetings between Prime minister
Thatcher and Premier Zhao Ziyang and Chairman Deng Xiaoping
started the actual negotiation on the future of Hong Kong.
Both sides reiterated their positions on Hong Kong and
formally agreed to enter into diplomatic talks to reach "the
common aim of maintaining the stability and prosperity of
Hong Kong." Although both sides agreed to start the
negotiations on Hong Kong's future they started from very
different legal positions. China, while agreeing that
promises had to be made to ensure the economic prosperity and
stability of Hong Kong, remained adamant that sovereignty of
all of Hong Kong belonged to them and would be reasserted in
49
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1997, regardless of what the British did. Mrs. Thatcher
responded to these statements by insisting that the three
treaties were valid and legal and that Britain intended on
keeping its treaty obligations including the lease on the
53New Territories. Her insistence upon the legality of the
treaties and Britain's responsibility for the welfare of the
people of Hong Kong prompted protests from China and the
whipping up of anti-British sentiment within China and Hong
Kong. These protests against the "imperialist" British spread
and left a generally negative impression of the British
position throughout the World. China reacted virulently
against her legalistic claims upon Hong Kong and her assertion
that Britain had a moral obligation to ensure the welfare of
the Hong Kong people. They perceived these assertions as
demonstrations of the British distrust of and lack of respect
for the Chinese side.
The Chinese succeeded in portraying the British as evil
colonialists determined to hold onto Hong Kong despite the
"illegality" of the "Unequal Treaties." Their "war dance"
villified the British and proclaimed the PRC as the true pro-
tectors of the Hong Kong Chinese and the reunifiers of China.
The Chinese propaganda campaign continued until the end of
52
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October 1982, by which time they had established their case
not only within China but internationally.
The Chinese realized that they could easily dictate the
terms of the retrocession since the colony was militarily
indefensible, but they wanted the cooperation and assistance
of the British and Hong Kong interests in maintaining the
territory's prosperity at the least political costs to the
PRC. Their "war dance" must be seen as part of this effort.
They attempted to achieve four objectives: 1) to force the
British into precipitiously giving up what the PRC wanted;
2) to both frighten and seduce the Hong Kong Chinese away
from the British; 3) to pacify a very powerful bureaucracy
in Beijing that does not want to give anything away too
quickly; and 4) to villify the British so that when con-
cessions were made later in the negotiations it would still
appear as a great victory for China. The campaign achieved
most of its objectives although it was another year before
the British conceded sovereignty and the Hong Kong people,
while generally desirious of continued British rule, came to
accept the eventual Communist takeover.
The Chinese propaganda effectively went beyond the
normal internal and external channels of PRC propaganda to
influence reports carried on the BBC and in the New York Times ,
(examples: Daniel Nelson, "Maggie sinks in the West," Far
Eastern Economic Review
,
8 October 1982, p. 9; Christopher
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,
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The first round of talks were held in Beijing in early
October between the British Ambassador to China, Sir Percy
Cradock and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, with Hong Kong
represented by the political advisor Robin MacLaren. This
round was concerned primarily with setting up an agenda and
57procedures for future negotiations. As with future rounds
of the negotiations, both sides maintained confidentiality
and ended the talks without releasing any information. It
was later revealed that Chinese insistence upon establishing
their "two principles" prior to continuing the negotiations
resulted in the suspension of formal talks until July 1983.
These principles were that sovereignty and administrative
responsibility for Hong Kong would revert to Beijing on
1 July 1997.
The eight months between the first and second round of
negotiations saw the collapse of the Hong Kong stock market
and the weakening of the Hong Kong dollar. The volatile Hong
Kong stock market reacted negatively to all the uncertainty
generated by the Sino-British talks, especially the virulent
Chinese propaganda campaign against the three treaties. Fear
of Chinese control of Hong Kong generated wide-spread panic
among investors who had been looking for concrete guarantees
from China that there would be no disruption of the territory's
56 Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997
,
pp. 120-121.
57 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Draft Agreement on the
Future of Hong Kong, p. 3.
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economic system. The Hang Seng index fell 83.7 points on
September 27 and continued to fall until early December when
it reached a low of 676.3 points, a total drop of 420 points
from 24 September 1982. 58 The Hong Kong dollar suffered a
similar decline by falling to a low of HK$ 6.60 to the U.S.
dollar. When the talks broke down in October over the sover-
eignty issue, investor confidence declined further and pro-
longed the economic downturn. China accused the United
Kingdom of manipulating the Hong Kong economy to frighten
them, but they gradually learned throughout 1983 that Hong
Kong's economy is extremely volatile and susceptible to
changes in the political climate.
Although formal talks were stalled until July 1983 both
sides were busy. Various scenarios for the future of Hong
Kong were developed and proposed as were recommendations for
different methods of negotiating. One of these proposals
was the "three-legged stool" concept in which Hong Kong people
would play an active role in determining their future. This
proposal was vetoed by the Chinese immediately, but the
concept remained extremely popular within Hong Kong.
Progress was made when Mrs. Thatcher conditionally con-
ceded to China the sovereignty principle in a letter to Zhao
Ziyang in February 1983. It had become quite clear that the
58 Christopher Wood, "Down and down it goes," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 8 October 1982, p. 8.
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United Kingdom had to tacitly concede the sovereignty issue
if the negotiations were to procede and the British were to
have any input into determining the future of Hong Kong. This
move allowed the Chinese to reinitiate the talks while keeping
the United Kingdom in the role of a supplicant and not an
equal. As supplicants, the British were not able to use
Hong Kong's economic importance to China as leverage in
gaining concessions, instead they were constantly placed in
the position of asking favors from the Chinese.
After the September 1983 economic collapse, the British
bargaining position vis-'a-vis the Chinese improved. The
Chinese began to realize that the Hong Kong system was
extremely volatile and easily upset by sudden unpredictable
changes and that if they were to maintain its prosperity they
must listen to the British and guarantee the continuation of
the present system without political interference. This
change meant that the Chinese could not keep the British in
the supplicant role.
Prior to the start of the second round of talks in early
July 1983, the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Edward Youde,
announced that he would participate in the talks as the
Governor of Hong Kong and the representative of the people of
59Hong Kong. This remark generated quite a row. In April
59
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the Hong Kong press carried reports that his participation
in the talks would not be welcomed by the Chinese since it
could lead to the introduction of the "three-legged stool"
concept by having Hong Kong interests represented by a
seperate participant. The Chinese Foreign Ministry
responded quickly by stating that the talks were "bilateral"
and that Governor Youde was a member of the British Government
delegation and thus only able to represent the British
Government. Governor Youde ' s prestige was further lessened
when the Chinese refused to grant a visa to Peter Tsao, who
was to serve as Youde ' s personal press officer. This action
was seen not only as a personal affront to Youde but as a
reminder that China was guiding the talks and did not want
any Hong Kong presence at the talks.
C. THE SUBSTANTIVE PHASE
The substantive phase of the negotiations on Hong Kong
began on 12 July 1983. These talks were to focus on the
concrete problems caused by the expiration of the 1898 lease
and to develop a workable solution. Talks began then, but
little progress was made towards reaching a consensus on the
basic framework for an agreement ensuring the future pros-
perity and stability of Hong Kong. Both countries refused to
60
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to make early concessions. Instead they held fast to their
initial positions. The Chinese used the leftist Hong Kong
press and various visitors to China to propose various
solutions and test their acceptability. These proposals
promised various guarantees to the Hong Kong people, but the
Chinese negotiators were unwilling to put them into a legally
binding document. Instead they attempted to force the British
into conceding everything without giving any concessions.
This ploy became increasingly apparent in late August and
early September with Hu Yaobang's and Deng Xiaoping 's state-
ments on the future of Hong Kong asserting that China would
take possession of Hong Kong on July 1, 1997 and that the
Sino-British talks only dealt with the "question of how to
gradually carry out the transition from now until 1997."
These statements were accompanied by an intense Chinese
propaganda campaign aimed at softening the British negotiating
position by attacking it. The British interpreted the Chinese
moves as an ultimatum demanding an act of surrender rather
than an agreement transferring sovereignty while maintaining
prosperity. As a result the British held firm at the
September 22 meeting and refused to concede anything.
The Chinese propaganda attack appeared to be demanding
three things from the British: 1) to concede all sovereignty
"Hu Yaobang: PRC to Recover Hong Kong 1 July 1997,"
FBIS China
,
16 August 1983, p. Wl ; "Deng Outlines Policies,
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to Beijing; 2) to transfer all power over to the People's
Republic of China; and 3) to leave for home without de-
stroying economic confidence in Hong Kong. Their attack
destroyed investor confidence in Hong Kong's future and pre-
cipitated the collapse of the Hang Seng and the disasterous
drop in the value of the Hong Kong dollar. The closing of
the September 22-23 session without the usual optimistic
statement sent the HK dollar to a record low of HK $9.55
against the U.S. dollar and the Hang Seng recorded a 63.58
drop to 785.48 points. Both the drop in the HK dollar and
the drop in the Hang Seng reflected the loss of confidence
in the future of Hong Kong by the local and international
business communities. The Hong Kong Government finally inter-
vened to prevent any further decline in the value of the HK
dollar by pegging it to the U.S. dollar at HK $7.80 to the
U.S. $1.00. 64 This move stabilized the HK dollar's exchange
rate and demonstrated to the PRC the Hong Kong Government's
determination to maintain prosperity and stability.
China accused the United Kingdom of playing the economic
and public opinion cards by blaming Beijing for the loss of
confidence in the Hong Kong dollar and investments as well
as the British insistence that the Hong Kong people were
Michael Blendell, "Panic Stations Over Hong Kong Talks,"
Sunday Times (London), 25 September 1983, p. 55; David Bonavia,
"Hong Kong Panic," Sunday Times (London), 25 September 1983,
p. 2.
64 Philip Bowring, "Pegged to the future," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 27 October 1983, p. 56.
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opposed to reunification. These claims soured when China
lost a considerable amount of foreign exchange in the
September dollar collapse. This experience convinced them
that Hong Kong needed an agreement that would give investors
and the business community sufficient guarantees to prevent
the wild fluctuations based upon perceived political and
economic uncertainty. It also convinced the Chinese and
British of the necessity to bargain in good faith, and for
both sides to give on the issues of sovereignty and future
administration.
The negotiations entered a more realistic substantive
phase after the September economic crisis. Talks restarted
on 19 October 1983 under more optimistic circumstances than
in September, with their statements prior to the meeting
showing an improvement in the atmosphere of the Sino-British
talks and a "backing off from confrontationist attitudes."
The British and the Chinese realized the importance of the
talks and reportedly took more reasonable positions on the
sovereignty and future administration issues. Eight rounds
of talks passed between October 1983 and April 1984 when the
next major announcement was made.
China increased its pressure upon the British negoti-
ators by placing a September 1984 deadline on reaching an
Philip Bowring and Teresa Ma, "Warming to the task,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 November 1983, p. 20.
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agreement. They stressed that if the United Kingdom
refused to negotiate or stonewalled they would announce uni-
laterally their own plan for the future of Hong Kong which
would not have the status of an international treaty. As a
result the talks continued with the British conditionally
conceding to the Chinese both sovereignty and future adminis-
tration. By April, the negotiators completed their initial
discussions on the problems of maintaining Hong Kong's
prosperity and had reached "a basis for agreement."
Speculation on a British retreat from Hong Kong led to a
poor investment climate in Hong Kong throughout 1983 and 1984.
Jardine Matheson and Hutchinson Whampoa demonstrated a clear
lack of confidence in the ability of the Sino-British negoti-
ations to reach an acceptable agreement that would guarantee
the future prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. On 28 March
1984, Jardine Matheson announced the moving of its corporate
headquarters to Bermuda, and Hutchinson Whampoa paid a big
dividend to its stockholders rather than reinvesting its
profits into Hong Kong assets. News of these actions by
Teresa Ma, "Cinderalla syndrome," Far Eastern Economic
Review
,
20 October 1983, pp. 29-30.
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two of the major hongs threatened to destroy the remaining
confidence in the territory's future and lead to the flight
69
of capital out of Hong Kong. Luckily the majority of the
investors and corporations assumed a "wait and see" attitude
rather than commit themselves to either long-term investments
in Hong Kong or capital flight. The Hong Kong and Chinese
Governments demonstrated their commitment to the future
prosperity of Hong Kong by continuing to invest in long-term
projects such as the MTR and various commercial and residential
projects
.
Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was invited to Beijing by
the Chinese Government in April 1984 to discuss the negoti-
ations. He met with the Chinese leadership from 15 to 18
April and reached agreement over the basic framework of the
Joint Declaration. Following those meetings, Howe announced
to the media the British Government's position on the future
administration of Hong Kong. He announced the British
acceptance of Chinese sovereignty with a highly autonomous
Hong Kong Government under the label of a Special Administrative
Region (SAR) . He also stressed that the United Kingdom and
PRC still had several major issues to resolve before reaching
69Christopher Wood and Philip Bowring, "Jardine's Bermudan
rig," Far Eastern Economic Review
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a legally binding agreement guaranteeing the preservation
of the Hong Kong way of life.
The negotiations continued after Howe's visit and enough
progress was made by mid-June to justify the establishment
of a working group on 21 June 1984. This group met full-time
in Beijing to intensively analyze, discuss, and draft
position papers on the various problem areas between the two
sides. Working six days a week, the working group attempted
to resolve problems between scheduled sessions.
Many in Hong Kong feared that the British Foreign Office
was being out-manuevered by the Chinese negotiators and thus
not achieving the best deal for Hong Kong. "An Open Letter
to Sir Geoffrey Howe" in the Far Eastern Economic Review
was representative of the feelings of the Hong Kong leader-
ship, both political and economic, in their lack of confidence
70in an agreement being reached. In that article, Howe was
called upon to stand fast and draw the line over which
Britain would not yield rather than continuing to follow
the perceived policy of continued concessions. The British
negotiators did hold fast to their insistence upon an
agreement that was balanced, secure, and not overridden by
the Basic Law.
A major breakthrough was achieved during Sir Geoffrey
Howe's second visit to Beijing in late July 1984. He
Derek Davies, "An Open Letter to Sir Geoffrey Howe,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 June 1984, pp. 40-43.
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succeeded in getting the PRC to concede on the key aspects
of the agreement. This included agreement upon "the frame-
work and key clauses of an agreement that would preserve
Hong Kong's unique economic system and way of life" and
assurances that the agreement and the annexes would be
71legally binding upon all parties. Howe got the Chinese to
concede those points by using the issue of the Joint Liaison
Group and their own September deadline. China had been
determined to get a group formed that could function as a
shadow government, an idea that has been opposed by the
United Kingdom and Hong Kong Governments since the 1950' s.
In return for agreement on the framework and key clauses of
the Joint Declaration the United Kingdom conceded the
formation of a Joint Liaison Group but forced the Chinese to
delay its formation until 1988; to agree that it would have
no power or role in administering Hong Kong; and to extend
its period of operation until the year 2000, thus granting
the British two and a half years of extended official presence
72in Hong Kong. This breakthrough would not have been
achieved without the intervention of Deng Xiaoping during the
meetings between him, British Foreign Secretary Howe, Chinese
Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, and Premier Zhao Ziyang.
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D. THE FINAL DRIVE TO AGREEMENT
Although substantial progress had been made by early
August 1984 another seven weeks of hard work remained before
the texts of the agreements were drafted and approved. There
were several very important issues that needed to be resolved
prior to initialing. These issues included land policy,
nationality, the nature of the future Hong Kong Government,
73defense and security, civil aviation and the civil service.
The working group continued meeting six days a week and was
expanded by five members to deal with the large volume of
material and to speed up the drafting of the agreement.
By early September several of the issues had been resolved
but the problems still remained over the issues of civil
aviation and nationality. The nationality issue was never
solved to the satisfaction of the Hong Kong Chinese. China
refused to accept the concept of dual citizenship, and Great
Britain has been guilty of cheapening the status of British
Hong Kong passports with the Nationality Act of 1981, which
changed them to Hong Kong British Dependent Territory Citizen
(BDTC) . The 2.5 million holders of HK BDTC ' s are unable to
use their passports to settle in the United Kingdom. The
PRC saw the Nationality Act of 1981 as a lack of British
resolve on the nationality issue. This perception allowed
them to ignore the British position and insist upon their own.
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Once nationality and land policy were resolved, all
attention turned to civil aviation. The British expanded the
working group to ten with the addition of a civil aviation
74
expert on 5 September 1984. This action was perceived as
signalling general agreement on the aviation issue and the
start of the actual working out of details. Civil aviation
was a problem area because of the dual role played by the
General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (known as
CAAC). CAAC functions as the flag airline of China and the
department of civil aviation. Problems arose over the issue
of Air Services Agreements (ASAs) and whether they should
revert to Hong Kong or China. British negotiators wanted the
ASAs to revert to Hong Kong as they came up for revision and
continue to be under Hong Kong's jurisdiction after 1997.
CAAC opposed this, wanting instead complete control of Hong
Kong's landing and traffic rights making it just another
destination in China and making Cathy Pacific the Number Two
airline operating, if at all. The Chinese negotiators
finally conceded to the British and gave the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region the authority to negotiate ASAs
75
with third countries and to maintain their own airlines.
The negotiators completed drafting both the Chinese and
English texts by the middle of September and both sides
"British Aviation Expert Joins Talks," FBIS China
,
September 1984, pp. W5-W6.
75Michael Westlake, "Still up in the air," Far Eastern
Economic Review
,
6 September 1984, pp. 14-15.
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approved the texts on 18 September 1984. The Joint
Declaration was initialled by the Chief Negotiators, Chinese
Vice-Foreign Minister Zhou Nan and British Ambassador Sir
Richard Evans on 26 September 1984. This ceremony included
the initialling and exchange of the Joint Declaration, its
three annexes and an exchange of memoranda on the post 1997
nationality status of the 2.5 million holders of Hong Kong
7 f\
British Dependent Territory Citizen passports.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed with great
ceremony by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang on 19 December 1984 in the Great
Hall of the People in Beijing. This ceremony formally started
the retrocession of Hong Kong back to China and marked the
77
end of 155 years of British colonial rule. Both the United
Kingdom and the People's Republic of China are required to
ratify the Joint Declaration to give it the force of a
formal treaty in international law. The British Parliament
approved the agreement on 28 March 1985 and the New People's
78Congress is expected to approve it before July 1985.
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Once the agreement is ratified the British, Hong Kong
and the Chinese will have twelve years to complete the
transition from a British colony to a Special Administrative
Region of the PRC. This period marks the start of a new
political and economic experiment for China and the World.
China is attempting to peacefully regain the sovereignty of
Hong Kong without disturbing its economic, social and poli-
tical systems under the framework established in the Joint
Declaration. Deng Xiaoping' s concept of "One Country-Two
Systems" forms the basis by which the Chinese granted Hong
Kong its guarantees in the Joint Declaration, and explains
their rationale for accepting the continuation of Capitalism
in post 1997 Hong Kong.
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V. SINO-BRITISH JOINT DECLARATION ON HONG KONG
The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong
Kong is a detailed and reasonable document that resulted from
two years of intense and at times bitter negotiations between
the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China. It
represents the hopes, promises and commitment of both sides
to the maintenance of prosperity and stability in Hong Kong.
Despite its official title of Joint Declaration, the United
Kingdom and the PRC have recognized it as a legal inter-
national treaty. It is this document that differentiates
Hong Kong's status as a Special Administrative Region from
that of Tibet. China, by freely joining in an international
agreement, has formally committed itself to following the
guidelines laid down in the declaration as a prerequisite
for continued investor confidence in the territory.
The agreement covers a wide range of topics and provides
some fairly generous, if general, guarantees to the people
of Hong Kong and the rest of the international community.
China gave in to British demands for a legally binding docu-
ment that spelled out in sufficient detail the Chinese
promises and the framework within which they would operate.
While recognizing British administration and responsibility
for Hong Kong up through 1997, it proclaims China's claim to
sovereignty over Hong Kong and the Chinese assumption of
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administration after 1997. China, faced with resistance on
the mainland over the promises given to Hong Kong, justifies
its promises for the maintenance of Hong Kong's capitalist
system until 2047 under the guise of "One Country- Two
Systems." This system allows China to reunite Hong Kong
with the mainland without losing the economic and technical
benefits inherent in the current system. The success of the
"One Country- Two Systems" line in Hong Kong is seen as a
possible lure to the Chinese on Taiwan in the PRC ' s bid to
reunite all of China.
The full text of the Joint Declaration is contained in
Appendix E, but this chapter will examine in detail six
major issues crucial to the future of Hong Kong. These
issues are: 1) China's twelve point guarantee to continue
Hong Kong's present system for fifty years; 2) the future
government of the Hong Kong SAR and its future constitution,
the Basic Law; 3) Land Leases; 4) Civil avaiation; 5) Nation-
ality; and 6) the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. Not all
of these issues were fully resolved during the negotiations
and problems have already emerged. These problems include
the status of non-Chinese Hong Kongers after 1997; who will
be the final court of appeal for cases stemming from the
Basic Law, Beijing or Hong Kong; the future role and
accountability of the PLA stationed in Hong Kong; and the
role of Hong Kong Chinese in the Joint Liaison Group.
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A. CHINA'S 12 POINT POLICY REGARDING HONG KONG
The People's Republic of China declared in the Joint
Declaration and elaborated in the first annex its twelve
point policy regarding Hong Kong. This statement of policy
establishes Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region
(SAR) , in accordance with Article 31 of the Chinese Consti-
tution. The Hong Kong SAR was granted an exceptional degree
of autonomy in domestic affairs and limited control over its
own foreign affairs. China granted Hong Kong special guaran
tees to ensure its continued economic prosperity including
promises that the retrocession of Hong Kong would not change
the existing social, political or economic systems operating
in the territory or subject them to the direct control of
the mainland. All of these promises and guarantees would
remain in force for a period of fifty years, until the year
2047, and be contained in Hong Kong's future constitution,
the Basic Law.
The elaboration and detailing of the various Chinese
guarantees to Hong Kong within the Joint Declaration were a
major victory for the United Kingdom. The Chinese, through-
out the negotiations, wanted a blanket statement by the
British returning all of Hong Kong to the PRC without any
references to specific guarantees to the people of Hong Kong
By forcing the delineation of these promises in a legally
binding international agreement, the British were able to
provide the international business community and the Hong
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Kong people a legal guarantee, by the Chinese, ensuring the
stability of Hong Kong until the year 2047 under the current
social, political and economic systems. This was the sort
of guarantee needed to ensure the maintenance of confidence
in Hong Kong as a vital and secure economic and financial
center of Asia. Without a treaty delineating Chinese policy,
there existed no guarantee that China would not repeat their
actions of Tibet in 1959 or Shanghai in 1950.
China's promises to Hong Kong are wide-ranging, covering
social, political and economic issues. The maintenance of
Hong Kong's economic prosperity is important to China. To
accomplish this, China promises to preserve Hong Kong's legal
and socio-economic systems and to forestall any attempt to
force socialism upon the SAR. Hong Kong will retain its
position as a free port and separate customs zone as well as
its status as an international financial center with markets
for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures. The SAR
will also retain the use of the Hong Kong dollar as the
official currency and maintain the dollar's status as a
freely convertible world currency, thus allowing the freer
flow of capital. These actions are coupled with Hong Kong's
independent status from the Central People's Government on
the issues of taxes and finance, and participation in
international organizations and trade agreements (GATT, MFA)
.
By granting Hong Kong the authority to decide its own economic,
financial and trade policies, the PRC is granting Hong Kong
authority to expand and maintain economic relations with all
nations, including those states not recognized by the PRC
(i.e. Taiwan and the Republic of Korea).
B. THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG
Hong Kong's current government and legal system are based
upon British Common Law, the Letters Patent and the Royal
Instructions. These constitutional instruments theoretically
permit the Governor to practice almost dictatorial power over
the colony, while in reality, he is constrained by various
customs, conventions and unwritten rules. Instead of a dic-
tatorship the government is consultative in that the Governor
consults with the Executive Council (EXCO) and Legislative
79Council (LEGCO) prior to reaching a decision. The Chinese
desired a continuation of this system but the British insisted
upon a more representative form of government. The repre-
sentative government is not currently in place in Hong Kong,
8 Dbut progress has been made at slowly implementing it. It
is because of the British attempt to install a representative
form of government in Hong Kong prior to 1997, rather than
retaining the current system, that the Joint Declaration is
7 Q
Norman J. Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong
Kong 2d ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1977),
pp. 63-67.
Plans for the development of representative government
in Hong Kong were released by the Hong Kong Government in
1984. The first plan was a Green Paper released in July 1984,
which was further refined and released as a White Paper in
November 1984.
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vague on the actual composition and method of selecting a
Chief Executive and legislature.
When Hong Kong becomes a Special Administrative Region
(SAR) of the PRC, the Basic Law will replace the Letters
Patent and the Royal Instructions as constitutional instru-
ments, but will retain the Common Law system. These unwritten
laws provide the legal system with credibility. The inter-
national business community needs the assurance and pro-
tection of Western Common Law if it is to invest and work in
Hong Kong
.
The United Kingdom is attempting to establish a
constitutional system in Hong Kong that will last after 1997.
Although faced with a time constraint, the British realize
that the system cannot be rushed into place. Rushing it
would show undue haste and give the impression that the
United Kingdom was washing its hands of the entire matter.
Instead the British have been accused of going too slow
towards representative government and democracy by the Hong
O 1
Kong Press. What is desired in Hong Kong is the election
of both the Chief Executive and Legislature, with the Chief
Executive Bound to the Legislature and the Basic Law. This
is a much better position for the British since it will be
harder for the Chinese to criticize the British efforts as
O I
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"colonial tricks" if the people of Hong Kong are demanding
more rapid democratization. Hong Kong will not have a
democracy in the same sense as the United States, it will
have direct elections to the District and Rural boards but
the Chief Executive and Legislature will most likely be
elected indirectly. It is important to the future stability
of Hong Kong not to move too quickly towards full democracy,
since it risks tremendous social costs, but it must move in
that direction if the government is to be firmly implanted
in the Hong Kong community and have the support of all levels
of society.
There is a rising tide of interest in politics and
democracy in Hong Kong. This interest is especially pro-
nounced within the liberal intellectual middle class who are
calling for rapid democratization along U.S. lines. Emily
Lau of the Far Eastern Economic Review is representative of
this group and one of the most outspoken critics of the
o 2
British administration's plan to increase democracy. Hong
Kong businessmen recognize the dangers of too rapid demo-
cratization and fear the economic disruption that could
result from widespread political unrest. They are determined
to forestall the disruptive effects of democracy that were
observed in both Singapore and the Philippines. The British
8 2
Emily Lau, "A shade of difference," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 29 November 1984, pp. 15-16.
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plan for greater representation in Hong Kong's Government is
intended to limit the growth and influence of political
parties, prevent socio-political unrest and forestall Chinese
intervention in Hong Kong's politics.
The National People's Congress (NPC) of the PRC will
draft The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR. This document will
function as the SAR's constitution, will embody the provisions
of the Joint Declaration and its Annexes, and specifically-
state that Hong Kong's current "capitalist system and life-
style shall remain unchanged for 50 years," and that "the
socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practiced"
o -z
in Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration gives the Hong Kong
courts the power of final judgement and final adjudication.
The common interpretation of this includes the Hong Kong
courts right to interpret the Basic Law, much like the U.S.
84Supreme Court. The chairman of the standing committee of
the National People's Congress, Peng Zhen, stated that the
"right to interpret the Basic Law should rest with the NPC
o c
standing committee." This has led to much speculation
within Hong Kong over China's intent. If China insists upon
the right to interpret the Basic Law, it could contravene
8 3 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Draft Agreement on the
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the Joint Declaration by taking away the Hong Kong court's
right of final adjudication. China could establish a
dangerous precedent by using the right to interpret the
Basic Law to overturn judgements of the Hong Kong courts.
Meddling in the decisions of the Hong Kong courts could cause
a loss of confidence in China's willingness to abide by the
Joint Declaration, not only in Hong Kong but throughout the
world. This issue is still not resolved but it appears
likely that China will not push the issue for fear of
damaging Hong Kong's prosperity and stability.
The future Chief Executive of Hong Kong must be acceptable
to both the Hong Kong and international business communities
and the People's Republic of China. As such he cannot be
too pro-West or ant i- Communist . Instead he must be a proven
administrator capable of leading Hong Kong without antagon-
izing the communist leadership in Beijing. The most likely
candidate will come out of the Hong Kong Chinese business
community with ties to both the West and China. Ethnic
Chinese with close ties to the British colonial administration
will be viewed with suspicion and thus not acceptable to
Beijing. If Hong Kong is to survive and prosper the people
of Hong Kong must learn to administer themselves successfully
so that economic prosperity is maintained and China is not
provoked or tempted to meddle in Hong Kong's affairs. It
This group would include the current unofficial members
of the Executive and Legislative Councils (Umelco)
.
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will not be easy, for it will require not only a skillful
and responsible Chief Executive but great self-restraint on
the part of the Chinese leadership to adhere to the terms
of the Joint Declaration and not attempt to manipulate either
the political or economic system.
Even with all these problems, progress is being made to
establish a workable representative government responsive
to the needs of capitalist Hong Kong and sensitive to the
fears and desires of the Chinese Communist leadership. China
has promised considerable autonomy to the Hong Kong SAR Gov-
Government. If they can abide by the agreement and do not
attempt to manipulate the Basic Law or political system,
Hong Kong should prosper and develop a reasonable and
effective representative government committed to maintaining
the SAR's autonomy and prosperity.
C. LAND LEASES
Land leases and land tenure posed serious problems for
the British as the 1997 deadline approached. It was vital
to reach some agreement on the future of the leases, since
the Hong Kong Government could not legally continue leasing
land after 30 June 1997. The United Kingdom attempted to
solve this problem prior to reaching a political solution,
but it was thwarted by the Chinese who wanted to resolve the
sovereignty issue first. Once work started on the land issue
it became apparent that the mixture of land arrangements,
64
ranging from freehold rights in the New Territories to Royal
grants and 75 year non-renewable leases in the urban areas,
posed the greatest technical difficulty faced in the
negotiations
.
This issue was resolved and explained in Annex III of
the Joint Declaration. The British and Chinese agreed to
the establishment of a Sino-British Land Commission to over-
see the Hong Kong Government's management of land sales and
receipts. China is concerned that the United Kingdom would
attempt to sell off all the crown land to maximize current
revenues and leave the Hong Kong SAR with no source of
income. To prevent this the present Hong Kong Government is
restricted to leasing only fifty hectares per year and must
place one half of the land lease proceeds into a Hong Kong
bank account reserved for the SAR Government. In return
the PRC and SAR Governments will honor the terms of all
leases extended by the British and which run beyond 1997.
It was also agreed that all leases could be extended to the
year 2047 without the payment of a premium but would be
subject to an annual rent equivalent to three percent of the
property's current rated value. This three percent rent will
also apply to those leases issued by the British between 1984
and 1997, the only exception to the three percent rent will
be the village lands in the New Territories held by direct
male descendents of the original inhabitants of Hong Kong
prior to 1898.
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The land policy established and laid out in Annex III is
reasonable and in sufficient detail to prevent difficulties.
It ensures a steady income for both the British adminis-
tration and the Hong Kong SAR Government. Land rents and
premiums provide the bulk of the Hong Kong Government's
revenues and this income has been protected by the Joint
Declaration.
D. CIVIL AVIATION
Civil aviation was one of the last issues resolved
between China and the United Kingdom. It was a problem due
to the dual role played by the General Administration of
Civil Aviation of China (CAAC) . CAAC insisted that it
should exercise complete control over Hong Kong's landing
and traffic rights as a matter of sovereignty. The British
negotiators insisted on allowing the Hong Kong SAR to maintain
and revise Air Services Agreements (ASAs) after 1997. It
was argued that local control of Hong Kong's landing and
traffic rights was essential if the SAR was to remain a
center of international and regional aviation. This control
includes the allocation of international routes and the
maintenance of routes to states not officially recognized by
the PRC. The negotiators also argued for the protection and
maintenance of Hong Kong based airlines from undue competition
o
-j
from CAAC. These points were conceded to the British and
o 7
Michael Westlake, "Still up in the air," Far Eastern
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Section IX of Annex I details the Hong Kong SAR's authority
to negotiate ASA's with third countries and to maintain their
own airlines.
This agreement protects Cathay Pacific Airline's future
by granting it the status of a Hong Kong incorporated
airline even though it is owned by a British company, Swires
Pacific. It will also allow the Hong Kong SAR to remain a
center of international and regional aviation and commerce
by allowing the SAR to retain aviation links between Taiwan
and the Republic of Korea. This link will enable China to
maintain covert ties with those countries without having to
recognize either one.
E. NATIONALITY
The Nationality issue has not been solved to the satis-
faction of the Hong Kong people. The major problem is China's
refusal to grant or recognize dual nationality. The British
have contributed to the problem by cheapening the value of
British Passports with the Nationality Act of 1968. This
act essentially created two British passports, one for whites
with full privileges and one for non-whites which denied them
the right of abode in Britain. This effectively made non-
white British citizens second-class citizens. This issue
was brought to a head in 1972 when Idi Amin expelled more
o o
than 50,000 Asians from Uganda. They became stateless
o o
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people when the United Kingdom refused to recognize them as
British subjects with the right of abode in the United
Kingdom. The British Nationality Act of 1981 did not resolve
the issue when it changed the status of Hong Kong British
Subjects to Hong Kong British Dependent Territory Citizens
(BDTC) , since it still denied them the right of abode in
Britain.
The Chinese have offered all Hong Kongers the right of
abode in the Hong Kong SAR after 1 July 1997, but they do
not recognize all of them as Chinese nationals. In the
Chinese memorandum it states that "all Hong Kong Chinese
89
compatriots... are Chinese nationals." but it does not
specify the status of the 7,000-10,000 non-Chinese Hong
Kongers. There is a fear among the non-Chinese that they
will suffer discrimination at the hands of the Chinese and
possibly face expulsion and statelessness.
Britain has decided to grant the 2.5 million holders of
Hong Kong BDTC passports the new status of British National
90Overseas (BNO) after 1997. This new status would be in
accordance with the exchange of memoranda on nationality, in
which former BDTC passport holders would be allowed to use
British passports as travel documents outside of China and
89 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Draft Agreement on the
Future of Hong Kong
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the Hong Kong SAR. It is doubtful that such a document will
have much value since it does not specify the holders place
of abode nor guarantee the repatriation of the holder back
to the Hong Kong SAR.
The Chinese feel they do not need to compromise on the
nationality issue. They feel it is a straight-forward issue
directly related to sovereignty and not open to discussion.
Since Britain has denied non-white British subjects the right
of abode in Britain since 1968, the Chinese feel they are
justified in standing firm in the face of Britain's history
of racism towards its non-white subjects.
There is no solution to the nationality issue that will
please all parties. It can only be hoped that after 1997
cool heads will prevail to prevent discrimination against or
expulsion of the non-Chinese minority. Recognition of the
BNO passport as a legitimate travel document is essential
if Hong Kong is to continue as a vibrant center of inter-
national finance and trade. Hong Kong businessmen need a
travel document that provides them with greater freedom and
acceptability than a PRC passport. Prior to this happening,
the United Kingdom and China must work out the details of
the document in the Joint Liaison Group so that it will meet
the requirements of Hong Kong, Britain and China.
F. THE SINO-BRITISH JOINT LIAISON GROUP
The Sino-British Joint Liaison Group (JLG) emerged out of
a Chinese demand for an official presence in Hong Kong prior
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to 1997. Both British and Hong Kong Governments had opposed
this idea since the 1950's, since it could provide the frame-
work necessary for the development of a Chinese shadow
government in Hong Kong. A Chinese shadow government would
threaten the stability of Hong Kong by challenging the
authority of the Hong Kong Government. Britain conceded to
the formation of a Joint Liaison Group in return for agreement
on the framework and key clauses of the Joint Declaration.
The Chinese were also forced into agreeing that the JLG would
not be an organ of power and would have no role in adminis-
91tering or supervising the administration of Hong Kong.
This group is to meet three times a year, starting 1 July
1988 and ending 1 January 2000, to discuss problem areas
related to the smooth transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty to
China. Both governments hope to use the JLG to ensure the
transition goes smoothly and to protect Hong Kong's role and
participation in various international organizations and
agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) , the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) , and various
Air Services Agreements (ASAs)
.
The Hong Kong Chinese desire a role in the Joint Liaison
Group but China has refused to allow separate Hong Kong
representation. The Chinese view this as an extension of
9
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the original Sino-British negotiations and as such the Chinese
state that China will represent Hong Kong's interests. If
Britain wishes to include the Hong Kong Chinese, it may be
allowed to include them as part of the five member British
delegation or part of the twenty member supporting group.
The Hong Kong members would be recognized not as Hong Kong
interests. Any attempt to alter the composition of the JLG
along the lines of a "three-legged stool" would go against
Chinese desires and the wording of the Joint Declaration.
Care must be taken on the part of the Chinese and the
British not to alter the Hong Kong people's perceptions of
the JLG. The bureaucratic members of the group must remember
that they are to only serve a liaison and consultative role
and not attempt to influence the administration of Hong Kong
or promote themselves as an alternate source of power in Hong
Kong. Any attempt to expand the JLG's role or power must be
nipped in the bud to forestall the formation of a shadow
government. The British should be able to do this since they
will be equal members of the JLG. It is also in China's
interests not to transform it into a shadow government since
it could prove a hinderance after 1997.
Since the Joint Declaration clearly spells out the role
of the Joint Liaison Group, China would have much to lose
in any attempt to alter the function of the JLG. Any attempt
to change the JLG's mission would be perceived as contra-
vening the Joint Declaration, thus threatening a loss of
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confidence in China's commitment to following the remainder
of the agreement. The fragility of investor and resident
confidence must be understood by China if they are to
administer Hong Kong successfully.
G. SUMMING-UP THE JOINT DECLARATION
The Joint Declaration is not a perfect document but it
does contain guarantees that, if followed by China, could
protect Hong Kong from the vagaries of Chinese Communist
politics. It is in the interests of China to maintain Hong
Kong's prosperity and stability at the lowest social and
political costs to the rest of China. This agreement ac-
complishes that by returning sovereignty to China and making
Hong Kong responsible for its own administration under the
guise of a Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China. The Joint Declaration guarantees Hong
Kong's retention of its capitalist system and way of life
until the year 2047 and grants the SAR Government considerable
autonomy in domestic affairs and in maintaining its role in
various international organizations and agreements. All of
these measures are necessary if Hong Kong is to remain one of
the leading commercial and financial centers of the world.
The majority of Hong Kongers, while not ecstatic over
the Joint Declaration, believe the British have achieved a
better than expected agreement. They have become more
optimistic about Hong Kong's future since the signing of the
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agreement and are now full of hope and belief in the
commitment of both the Chinese and British to make it work.
Hong Kongers have a growing realization that their future as
an independent SAR depends upon their continued economic
prosperity and development as a responsible and vital region
of the PRC.
Both sides are committed to making the agreement work not
only up to 1997 but beyond. It is not an iron-clad guarantee
that China will not interfere in Hong Kong's government or
economy if it is believed that they are operating contrary
to the interests and well-being of the SAR and the PRC. China
will quickly learn that such interference, if done in a
blatant and heavy-handed manner, will backfire and cause a
rapid decline in the SAR's economy due to a loss of confidence
in China's willingness to abide by the Joint Declaration.
Once confidence is lost it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to bring back. Investors and businessmen in
Hong Kong need a stable environment to prosper. Any Chinese
interference would be perceived as breaking the Joint
Declaration and threatening the foundation of Hong Kong's
stability, the rule of law. If the rule of law is lacking
there could develop a massive flight of capital out of Hong
Kong and the collapse of Hong Kong as a center of international
commerce and finance in the region. For these reasons, China
should think very carefully before attempting to manipulate
any aspect of the Hong Kong SAR's government, economy or
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social system. Any act of manipulation that contravenes the
Joint Declaration could seriously threaten the entire system
established in Hong Kong.
74
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The introduction asked three questions about the future
of Hong Kong and the viability of the Joint Declaration.
Although it is not a perfect document, it does establish a
workable system for the retrocession of Hong Kong back to
China and the Hong Kong SAR's future administration. As with
any treaty, it is only as good as the intentions and
commitment of the parties involved in signing the agreement.
The People's Republic of China has an excellent record of
abiding by its international treaties. This record gives
substantial weight to China's credibility in this agreement.
Unlike China's agreements with Tibet and the Shanghai
industrialists, this agreement is an international treaty,
reached between China and a Western Power, Great Britain.
The Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong is a
fair document that resolves three of the remaining Unequal
Treaties at the lowest social and political costs to China
while promising to maintain Hong Kong's prosperity and
stability. Although it promises to maintain Hong Kong's
unique social, economic and legal system until the year 2047,
it will be up to the Hong Kong people and the Chinese
leadership to ensure that situations do not erupt that would
force the abrogation of the treaty.
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China would be legally allowed to renounce the agreement
if there were a change in the economic prosperity and
stability of the Hong Kong SAR. This change would warrant
the PRC ' s invoking rebus sic stantibus , a device in inter-
national law that permits either of the contracting countries
in a treaty to legally abrogate the treaty due to changed
92
circumstances. This would be extremely useful if there is
a complete collapse of the Hong Kong economy or extreme
political and social unrest. This collapse could result from
too rapid democratization, so the liberal middle class Hong
Kongers must not push the British or the Chinese too fast for
increased democracy. Too much democracy too fast could
endanger the social and political stability of Hong Kong and
force the Chinese to severely restrict political activity,
freedom of the press and assembly.
The success of the Joint Declaration lies with the Hong
Kong people. They must realize that their independence and
way of life depend upon the success of the Hong Kong SAR
experiment. They must ensure that the SAR remains economi-
cally prosperous and socio-politically stable to keep the
provincial and central Communist leadership from interfering
even once in the administration of Hong Kong.
Business interests in Hong Kong must also practice
restraint and patience with the PRC. The Chinese are
Q 7 Oliver J. Lissitzyn, "Treaties and Changed Circumstances
( rebus sic stantibus )," American Journal of International Law
61 (October 1967): 895-898.
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attempting a novel experiment in socio-political relations
that is bound to experience minor problems. The "One
Country-Two Systems" approach to the Hong Kong problem pro-
vides many chances for success and failure. Deng Xiaoping
and the central CCP leadership are committed to this approach,
but if Western and Hong Kong business interests abandon Hong
Kong, China will not be able to replace the lost capital and
maintain the prosperity of the SAR. Thus it is necessary
that China make every effort to abide by the Joint Declaration
so as to maintain investor confidence and to ensure the con-
tinued economic prosperity of Hong Kong.
The issue of Taiwan works in Hong Kong's favor. China
wishes to demonstrate to Taiwan its willingness to abide by
the "One Country-Two Systems" approach. The PRC hopes to
convince Taiwan of its sincerity and commitment to this
theory in an attempt to reunite China. As long as Taiwan
remains independent, the Hong Kong experiment agreed to in
the Joint Declaration has a reasonable chance for success.
Hong Kong's future is bright despite the possible economic
and political difficulties. The British achieved a major
diplomatic victory in the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong.
China has entered into a legally binding international
agreement that grants Hong Kong special status with assurances
that the freedoms and unique way of life in Hong Kong can
continue until the year 2047, in an attempt to maintain its
economic vitality and prosperity. Profit is still to be
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made in the region and those companies that are optimistic
about the future of Hong Kong and Hong Kong's role as China's
entrepot will lead the way. Commitment to the success of
Hong Kong on the part of the British and the Chinese is
extremely important, but the PRC must also practice restraint
and not openly intervene in the economic, political and
social systems operating within Hong Kong. By not inter-
vening, the PRC will be expressing confidence in the ability
of the Hong Kong people to run the region effectively and
profitably, contributing to the success of China's "One
Country- Two Systems" concept.
APPENDIX A
TREATY OF NANKING, 18 4 2
TREATY OF Peace, Friendship, Commerce, Indemnity, $c, Between
Great Britan and China, Signed at Nanking, 29 August 1842.
(Ratifications exchanged at Hong Kong, 26 June 1843.)
Article III. It being obviously necessary and desirable, that
British subjects should have some Port whereat they may careen
and refit their Ships, when required, and keep Stores for that
purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty
the Queen of Great Britain, etc., the Island of Hongkong, to
be possessed in perpetuity by her Britannic Majesty, Her Heirs
and Successors, and to be governed by such Laws and Regulations
as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., shall see fit
to direct.
Done at Nanking and Signed and Sealed by the Plenipoten-
tiaries on board Her Britannic Majesty's ship "Cornwallis ,
"
this twenty-ninth day of August, 1842, corresponding with the
Chinese date, twenty- fourth day of the seventh month in the
twenty- second Year of Taou Kwang
.
(This Treaty was renewed and confirmed by Article I of the
Treaty of Tientsin in 1858)
Source: China, Inspectorate General of Customs, The Maritime
Customs, Treaties, Conventions, Etc., between China and Foreign
States , Vol. 1, 2d ed. (Shanghai: Inspectorate General of
Customs, 1917), pp. 351-356.
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APPENDIX B
THE LEASE OF KOWLOON
(a) A Deed of Lease [Enclosed in a Dispatch from Sir Hercules
Robinson to Duke of Newcastle, NO. 33, 20 March 1860]
Between Laou, wearing a decoration of the first rank, a
Director of the Board of War, Censor of Right, Governor-General
of the Provinces of Kwangtung and Kwang-se, and commander-in-
Chief of the same on the part of the Chinese Government, and
Harry Smith Parkes Esq., one of the Allied Commissioners for
the Government of the City of Canton on the part of the British
Government to hold in proof of the undermentioned agreement.
Whereas Tseem- sha- tsuy and its neighbourhood situated in
the subdistrict of Kowloon in the district of Sun-on, and
consisting for the most part of barren hills that cannot be
cultivated, has hitherto formed a place of resort for thieves
and outlaws, who, availing themselves of the immediate
proximity of Victoria, constantly cross to Hong Kong and
commit depredations in that settlement to the serious injury
of British subjects who can obtain no redress against these
marauders. - therefore Laou the Governor-General and Harry
Smith Parkes, the Commissioner, aforesaid, have agreed and
determined that all that part of the Kowloon Peninsula lying
south of a line drawn from a point near to but south of the
Kowloon fort to the northern-most point of Stonecutter Island,
together with that Island, as shown in the accompanying map,
shall be leased, as a preliminary measure, to Harry Smith
Parkes, the Commissioner aforesaid, acting on behalf of the
British Government, in order that the latter may exercise
complete control over the same, and take measures for the
protection of the good population and the expulsion or
punishment of the bad, as well as for bringing the whole
locality into order and preventing it becoming a resort for
thieves. It is further stipulated and agreed that a rental
of five hundred taels of silver shall be annually paid for the
same to the local Chinese authorities, and that no claim can
ever be made by the Chinese Government for the return of the
said ground as long as the British Government punctually pay
to them the said amount of rent. And this agreement will
continue in force until, in due representation to be made by
the Governor-General Laou, aforesaid, to the Supreme Government
of China the commands of his Imperial Majesty shall be received
authorising the conclusion of other arrangements of a more
permanent character.
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These done in duplicate, each of the parties aforesaid
one copy at Canton, this twentieth day of March in the year
of the Christian era 1860 (in words) being the 28th day of
the second month of the tenth year of the reign of the
Emperor of Sheen fung.
Source: George B. Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot (London
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1964), pp. 288-289).
APPENDIX C
CONVENTION OF PEKING (1860)
PREAMBLE OF CONVENTION
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and
his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China, being alike
desirous to bring to an end the misunderstanding at present
existing between their respective Governments, and to secure
their relations against further interruption, have for this
purpose appointed Plenipotentiaries; that is to say, Her
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, the Earl of
Elgin and Kincardine, and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of
China, His Imperial Highness, the Prince of Kung, who having
met, and communicated to each other their full powers, and
finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the
following Convention in Nine Articles :-
ARTICLE VI. With a view to the maintenance of law and order
in and about the harbor of Hongkong, His Imperial Majesty the
Emperor of China agrees to cede to Her Majesty the Queen of
Great Britain and Ireland, and to Her Heirs and Successors,
to have and to hold as a dependency of Her Britannic Majesty's
Colony of Hongkong, that portion of the township of Kowloon,
in the province of Kwangtung, of which a lease was granted
in perpetuity to Harry Smith Parkes, Esquire, Companion of
the Bath, a Member of the Allied Commission at Canton, on
behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by Lau Tsung
Kwang, Governor-General of the Two Kwang
.
It is further declared that the lease in question is
hereby cancelled, that the claims of any Chinese to property
on the said portion of Kowloon shall be duly investigated by
a mixed Commission of British and Chinese Officers and that
compensation shall be awarded by the British Government to any
Chinese whose claim shall be by the said Commission established,
should his removal be deemed necessary by the British Government
Done at Peking in the Court of the Board of Ceremonies on
the twenty-fourth day of October in the year of Our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty.
Source: China, Inspectorate General of Customs, The Maritime
Customs, Treaties, Conventions, Etc., between China and ForeTgn
States
,
Vol. 1, 2d ed. (Shanghai: Inspectorate General of
Customs, 1917), pp. 430-434.
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APPENDIX D
CONVENTION RESPECTING AN EXTENSION
OF THE HONGKONG TERRITORY* - June 9, 1898
Whereas it has for many years past been recognized that
an extension of Hong Kong territory is necessary for the
proper defence and protection of the Colony,
Territory leased . - It has now been agreed between the
Governments of Great Britain and China that the limits of
British territory shall be enlarged under lease to the extent
indicated generally on the annexed map. The exact boundaries
shall be hereafter fixed when proper surveys have been made
by officials appointed by the two Governments. The term of
this lease shall be ninety-nine years.
Jurisdiction in leased territory . - It is at the same time
agreed that within the city of Kowloon the Chinese officials
now stationed there shall continue to exercise jurisdiction
except so far as may be inconsistent with the military
requirements for the defence of Hong Kong. Within the
remainder of the newly-leased territory Great Britain shall
have sole jurisdiction. Chinese officials and people shall
be allowed as heretofore to use the road from Kowloon to
Hsinan.
Rights of Chinese ships . - It is further agreed that the
existing landingplace near Kowloon city shall be reserved for
the convenience of Chinese men-of-war, merchant and passenger
vessels, which may come and go and lie there at their pleasure;
and for the convenience of movement of the officials and
people within the city.
Railway . - When hereafter China constructs a railway to
the boundary of the Kowloon territory under British control,
arrangements shall be discussed.
Expropriation of natives . - It is further understood that
there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants
of the district included within the extension, and that if
land is required for public offices, fortifications, or the
like official purposes, it shall be bought at a fair price.
Extradition . - If cases of extradition of criminals occur,
they shall be dealt with in accordance with the existing
Treaties between Great Britain and China and the Hong Kong
Regulations
.
*Text as reprinted in Rockhill, p. 58, from British Treaty
Series . 1898, No. 16. Printed also in Customs , Vol. I, p. 539;
Hertslet, p. 120; Am. Int. Law Journal , Supplement, 1910, p. 295.
For the original concession of the Hongkong territory, see
Article 6 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of peace and friendship,
October 24, 1860 (Hertslet, p. 48).
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Chinese war ships . - The area leased to Great Britain as
shown on the annexed map, includes the waters of Mirs Bay and
Deep Bay, but it is agreed that Chinese vessels of war,
whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use
those waters.
This Convention shall come into force on the first day of
July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, being the thirteenth
day of the fifth moon of the twenty- fourth year of Kuang Hsu.
It shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of the two countries,
and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as
possible
.
In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the
present Agreement.
Done at Peking in quadruplicate (four copies in English
and four in Chinese) the ninth day of June, in the year of
our lord eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, being the twenty-
first day of the fourth moon of the twenty-fourth year of
Kuang Hsli.
[L. S.] Claude M. MacDonald
[L. S.] (Seal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary.)
Source: John V.A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with
and Concerning China 1894-1919 , Vol 1 (New York: Oxford




OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China have reviewed
with satisfaction the friendly relations existing between the two Governments
and peoples in recent years and agreed that a proper negotiated settlement of
the question of Hong Kong, which is left over from the past, is conducive to the
maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and to the further
strengthening and development o\ the relations between the two countries on a
new basis. To this end. they have, after talks between the delegations of the two
Governments, agreed to declare as follows:
1. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that to recover
the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island. Kowloon and the New
Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common aspiration of
the entire Chinese people, and that it has decided to resume the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.
2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong
Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997.
3. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that the




Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of
the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People's Republic of
China has decided to establish, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, a Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong.
(2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the
authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a
high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are
the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.
(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with
executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of
final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain
basically unchanged.
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(4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will
be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be appointed
by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of
elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will be
nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region for appointment by the Central People's Government.
Chinese and foreign nationals previously working in the public and
police services in the go\ernment departments of Hong Kong may
remain in employment. British and other foreign nationals may also be
employed to serve as advisers or hold certain public posts in government
departments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain
unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including
those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association,
of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of
occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured
by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private
property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and
foreign investment will be protected by law.
(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a
free port and a separate customs territory.
(7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of
an international financial centre, and us markets for foreign exchange,
gold, securities and futures will continue. There will be free flow of
capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to circulate and remain
freely convertible.
(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have independent
finances. The Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(9) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually
beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other coun-
tries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will be given due regard.
(10) Using the name of "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic
and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states,
regions and relevant international organisations.
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
may on its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from
Hong Kong.
(11) The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region will be the responsibility of the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
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(12) The above-stated baste polices of the People's Republic of Chinaregarding Hong Kong and the elaborate of them in Annex I to th.sW I A araUOn W,,i p M ' PUlated - m a Bas,c Uw °f tt* Hong KongSpeual dmims rat.ve Regton of the People's Republic of China by thSNational People's Congress of the People's Republic of China and they
will remain unchanged for 50 years. y
Peon'sSjKri- ^ ?*"!. Kmgd°m and the Government of theople s Republic ol Ch.na declare that, during the transitional period betweenthe date ol the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997 theGovernment ol the United Kingdom will be responsible for th adm n isTrationof Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving Us economicprosperity and social stability; and that ^Government of the Peop"Republic of Ch.na will give its cooperation in th.s connection. P
5 The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
gove'r mentTn w ^7^ "^ '" 0rder l° ensure a --tTtll'of
J mr n ? c r th a V,ew lo ,he e,Fecllve implementation of thisoin Declaration, a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group wil be set up when
Peo

















'° ralifi"«™ and shall enter into force ont ate of t e exc ange ol instruments of ratification, which shall take nlace inShX JUn ° l985 T^ '"'"' D-'— - - An'nexts^he
Done in duplicate at Beijine on iqiu ;„ , k. c , .
Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic











K 'ngd0m Government of the
01 reat Britain and Northern Ireland People's Republic of China
ANNEX I
ELABORATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OF ITS BASIC POLICIES REGARDING HONG KONG
The Government of the People's Republic of China elaborates the basic
policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong as set out in
paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong as follows:
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipulates in Article 31
that "the state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The
systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by-
laws enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific
conditions." In accordance with this Article, the People's Republic of China
shall, upon the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1
July PW7, establish the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China The National People's Congress of the People's
Republic of China shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter
referred lo as the Basic Law ) in accordance with the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China, stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policies shall
not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that
Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-stvle shall remain unchanged
for 50 years.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under the
authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of
China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except for foreign and
defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Govern-
ment, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with
executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to conduct on its own those external affairs
specified in Section XI of this Annex.
The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or
through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's
Government. Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated
by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and
appointed by the Central People's Government. The legislature of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections. The
executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the
legislature.
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In addition to Chinese, English may also he used in organs of government
and in the courts in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the People'sRepublic of China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may use a
regional flag and emblem of its own '
II
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Reeionthe laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law. rules of equity'
ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained'
save or any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to anv amendment bythe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature.
The legislative power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shallbe vested ,n the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative RegionThe legislature may on its own authority enact laws in accordance with theprovisions of the Basic Law and legal procedures, and report them to theStanding Committee ol the National People's Congress for the record Laws
enacted by the legislature which are in accordance w.th the Basic Law and legalprocedures shall be regarded as valid. g
The laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Recion shall be the Basic
HlaJ? ""•; '^ Previously , n force in Hong Kong and laws enacted bv theong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature as above
III
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
xceSif^ previousl >" PracUscd '» H^ Kong shall be maintainede cept tor thos, changes consequent upon the vesting in the courts offlielWKong Special Administrative Region of the power of final adjudication
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local judges. Additionally, ihe appointment or removal of principal judges (i.e.
those of the highest rank) shall be made by the chief executive with the
endorsement of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature and
reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the
record. The system of appointment and removal of judicial officers other thanjudges shall be maintained.
The power o f_fin al judgment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region 'snail be vested m the trmrt of final appeaj uuhgjjong Kong Special
Administrative Region, which may as required invite judges frbnTother
common Taw jurisdictions to sit on the court of final appeal.
A prosecuting authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference.
On the basis of the system previously operating in Hong Kong, the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own make
provision for local lawyers and lawyers from outside the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region to work and practise in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements
for reciprocal juridical assistance with foreign states.
IV
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
public servants previously serving in Hong Kong in all government depart-
ments, including the police department, and members of the judiciary may all
remain in employment and continue their service with pay. allowances, benefits
and conditions of service no less favourable than before. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government shall pay to such persons who
retire or complete their contracts, as well as to those who have retired before
1 July 1997. or to their dependants, all pensions, gratuities, allowances and
benefits due to them on terms no less favourable than before, and irrespective of
their nationality or place of residence.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may employ
British and other foreign nationals previously serving in the public service in
Hong Kong, and may recruit British and other foreign nationals holding
permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to
serve as public servants at all levels, except as heads of major government
departments (corresponding to branches or departments at Secretary level)
including the police department, and as deputy heads of some of those
departments. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may
also employ British and other foreign nationals as advisers to government
departments and. when there is a need, may recruit qualified candidates from
outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to professional and
technical posts in government departments. The above shall be employed only
in their individual capacities and. like other public servants, shall be responsible
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government.
The appointment and promotion of public servants shall be on the basis
of qualifications, experience and ability. Hong Kong's previous system of
recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for
the public service (including special bodies for appointment, pay and conditions
of service) shall, save for any provisions providing privileged treatment for
foreign nationals, be maintained.
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The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall deal on its own with
financial matters, including deposing of its financial resources and drawing up
its budgets and its final accounts The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall report its budgets and final accounts to the Central People's
Government for the record.
The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes on the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall use its financial revenues exclusively for us own purposes and they shall
not he handed over to the Central People's Government. The systems by which
taxation and public expenditure must be approved by the legislature, and by
which there is accountability 10 the legislature for all public expenditure, and
the system for auditing public accounts shall be maintained.
VI
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the capitalist
economic and trade systems previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall decide its economic
and trade policies on its own. Rights concerning the ownership of property,
including those relating to acquisition, use. disposal, inheritance and compensa-
tion for lawful deprivation (corresponding to the real value of the property
concerned, freely convertible and paid without undue delay) shall continue to be
protected by law.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of a
free port and continue a free trade policy, including the free movement of goods
and capital. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own
maintain and develop economic and trade relations with all states and regions.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs
territory. It may participate in relevant international organisations and inter-
national trade agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as
the General Agreement on laritfs and Trade and arrangements regarding
international trade in textiles. Export quotas, tariff preferences and other
similar arrangements obtained by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be enjoyed exclusively by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have authority to
issue its own certificates of origin for products manufactured locally, in
accordance with prevailing rules of origin.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may. as necessary, establish
official and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign countries,
reporting the establishment oi such missions to the Central People's Govern-
ment for the record.
VII
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of an
international financial centre The monetary and financial systems previously
practised in Hong Kong, including the systems of regulation and supervision
of deposit taking institutions and financial markets, shall be maintained.
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The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may decide its
monetary and financial policies on its own. It shall safeguard the tree operation
of financial business and the free flow of capita! within, into and out of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. No exchange control policy shall
be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Markets for
foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall continue.
The Hong Kong dollar, as the local legal tender, shall continue to circulate
and remain freely convertible. The authority to issue Hong Kong currency
shall be vested in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may authorise
designated banks to issue or continue to issue Hong Kong currency under
statutory authority, after satisfying itself that any issue of currency will be
soundly based and that the arrangements for such issue are consistent with the
object of maintaining the stability of the currency. Hong Kong currency bearing
references inappropriate to the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China shall be progressively replaced and
withdrawn from circulation.
The Exchange Fund shall be managed and controlled by the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government, primarily for regulating the ex-
change value of the Hong Kong dollar.
VIII
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain Hong Kong's
previous systems of shipping management and shipping regulation, including
the system for regulating conditions of seamen. The specific functions and
responsibilities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government
in the field of shipping shall be defined by the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region Government on Us own. Private shipping businesses and
shipping-related businesses and private container terminals in Hong Kong may
continue to operate freely.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be authorised by the
Central People's Government to continue to maintain a shipping register and
issue related certificates under its own legislation in the name of "Hong Kong,
China".
With the exception of foreign warshi ns. a ccess for which [gaujffs LJjg
pgrjaaiUM ill' iW ' Vnir il Btitfpto {jajaaameafc ships shall enjoy access to the
pons of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the
laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
IX
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the status
of Hong Kong as a centre of international and regional aviation. Airlines
incorporated and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong and
civil aviation related businesses may continue to operate. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall continue the previous system of civil
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aviation management in Hong Kong, and keep its own aircraft register in
accordance with provisions laid down by the Central People's Government
concerning nationality marks and registration marks of aircraft. The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible on its own for matters
of routine business and technical management of civil aviation, including the
management of airports, the provision of air traffic services within the flight
information region of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the
discharge of other responsibilities allocated under the regional air navigation
procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
The Central People's Government shall, in consultation with the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government, make arrangements providing for
air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other
parts of the People's Republic of China for airlines incorporated and having
their principal place of business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and other airlines of the People's Republic of China. All Air Service
Agreements providing for air services between other parts of the People's
Republic of China and other states and regions with stops at the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and air services between the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and other states and regions with stops at other parts of
the People's Republic of China shall be concluded by the Central People's
Government. For this purpose, the Central People's Government shall take
account of the special conditions and economic interests of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and consult the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region Government. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may participate as members of delegations
of the Government of the People's Republic of China in air service consultations
with toreign governments concerning arrangements lor such services.
Acting under specific authorisations from the Central People's Government,
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may:
renew or amend Air Service Agreements and arrangements previously in
force; in principle, all such Agreements and arrangements may be renewed
or amended with the rights contained in such previous Agreements and
arrangements being as far as possible maintained;
- negotiate and conclude new Air Service Agreements providing routes for
airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and rights for overflights and
technical stops; and
- negotiate and conclude provisional arrangements where no Air Service
Agreement with a foreign stale or other region is in force.
All scheduled air services to. from or through the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region which do not operate to, from or through the mainland of
China shall be regulated by Air Service Agreements or provisional arrangements
referred to in this paragraph.
The Central People's Government shall give the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region Government the authority to:
- negotiate and conclude with other authorities all arrangements concerning
the implementation of the above Air Service Agreements and provisional
arrangements;
- issue licences to airlines incorporated and having their principal place of
business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
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- designate such airlines under the above Air Service Agreements and
provisional arrangements; and
- issue permits to foreign airlines for services other than those to, from or
through the mainland of China.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the educa-
tional system previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government shall on its own decide policies in the fields
of culture, education, science and technology, including policies regarding the
educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the
allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards and
the recognition of educational and technological qualifications. Institutions of
all kinds, including those run by religious and community organisations, may
retain their autonomy. They may continue to recruit stall and use teaching
materials from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Students
shall enjoy freedom of choice o\' education and freedom to pursue their
education outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
XI
Subject to the principle that foreign affairs are the responsibility of the
Central People's Government, representatives of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of delegations
of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in negotiations at the
diplomatic level directly affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
conducted by the Central People's Government. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may on its own. using the name "Hong Kong, China",
maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with
states, regions and relevant international organisations in the appropriate fields,
including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communica-
tions, touristic, cultural and sporting fields. Representatives of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of
delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in interna-
tional organisations or conferences in appropriate fields limited to states and
affecting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or may attend in such
other capacity as may be permitted by the Central People's Government and the
organisation or conference concerned, and may express their views in the name
of "Hong Kong, China". The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may,
using the name "Hong Kong. China", participate in international organisations
and conferences not limited to slates.
The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of interna-
tional agreements to which the People'sRepublic of China is or becomes a party
shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with the
circumstances and needs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and
after seeking the views of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government. International agreements to which the People's Republic of China
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is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain
implemented in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Central
People's Go\ernment shall, as necessary, authorise or assist the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements
for the application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of other
relevant international agreements. The Central People's Government shall take
the necessary steps to ensure that the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall continue to retain its status in an appropriate capacity in those
international organisations of which the People's Republic of China is a member
and in which Hong Kong participates in one capacity or another. The Central
People's Government shall, where necessary, facilitate the continued participa-
tion of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in an appropriate
capacity in those international organisations in which Hong Kong is a partici-
pant in one capacity or another, but of which the People's Republic of China is
not a member.
Foreign consular and other official or semi-official missions may be estab-
lished in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with the approval of
the Central People's Government. Consular and other official missions estab-
lished in Hong Kong by stales which have established formal diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China may be maintained. According to
the circumstances of each case, consular and other official missions of states
having no formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China
may cither be maintained or changed to semi-official missions. States not
recognised by the People's Republic of China can only establish non-govern-
mental institutions.
The United Kingdom may establish a Consulate-General in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
XII
The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be the responsibility of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government. Military forces sent by the Central People's Government
to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for the
purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Expenditure for these military forces shall be
borne by the Central People's Government.
XIII
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall protect the
rights and freedoms of inhabitants and other persons in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region according to law. The Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for
by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person,
of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join trade
unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration,
of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the
home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a family freely.
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Every person shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the
courts, representation in the courts by lawyers of his choice, and to obtain
judicial remedies. Every person shall have the right to challenge the actions of
the executive in the courts.
Religious organisations and believers may maintain their relations with
religious organisations and believers elsewhere, and schools, hospitals and
welfare institutions run by religious organisations may be continued. The
relationship between religious organisations in the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region and those in other parts of the People's Republic of China shall
be based on the principles of non-subordination, non-interference and mutual
respect.
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights as
applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force.
XIV
The following categories of persons shall have the right of abode in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, and. in accordance with the law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, be qualified to obtain permanent
identity cards issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Govern-
ment, which state their right of abode:
- all Chinese nationals who were born or who have ordinarily resided in
Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more, and
persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of such Chinese
nationals;
- all other persons who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or
after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
for a continuous period of 7 years or more and who have taken Hong
Kong as their place of permanent residence before or after the establish-
ment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and persons
under 21 years of age who were born of such persons in Hong Kong
before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region;
- any other persons who had the right of abode only in Hong Kong before
the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government to issue, in accordance with the law,
passports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China to all Chinese nationals who hold permanent identity cards
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and travel documents of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to
all other persons lawfully residing in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. The above passports and documents shall be valid for all slates and
regions and shall record the holder's right to return to the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
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For the purpose of travelling to and from the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region, residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may
use travel documents issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government, or by other competent authorities of the People's Republic of
China, or of other states. Holders of permanent identity cards of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region may have this fact stated in their travel
documents as evidence that the holders have the right of abode in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of persons from
other parts of China shall continue to be regulated in accordance with the
present practice.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may apply
immigration controls on entry, stay in and departure from the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region by persons from foreign states and regions.
Unless restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be free
to leave the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region without special
authorisation.
The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government to conclude visa abolition agree-
ments with stales or regions.
ANNEX II
SINO-BRITISH JOINT LIAISON GROUP
1. In furtherance of their common aim and in order to ensure a smooth transfer
of government in 1997. the Government of the United Kingdom and the
Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed to continue their
discussions in a friendly spirit and to develop the cooperative relationship which
already exists between the two Governments over Hong Kong with a view to the
effective implementation of the Joint Declaration.
2. In order to meet the requirements for liaison, consultation and the exchange of
information, ihe two Governments have agreed to set up a Joint Liaison Group.
3. The functions o\' the Joint Liaison Group shall be:
ia) to conduct consultations on the implementation of the Joint Declaration;
[b) to discuss matters relating to the smooth transfer of government in 1997;
(c) to exchange information and conduct consultations on such subjects as
may be agreed by the two sides.
Matters on which there is disagreement in the Joint Liaison Group shall be
referred to the two Governments for solution through consultations.
4. Matters for consideration during the first half of the period between the
establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 shall include:
(a) action to be taken by the two Governments to enable the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to maintain its economic relations as a
separate customs territory, and in particular to ensure the maintenance
of Hong Kong's participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the Mullifibre Arrangement and other international arrange-
ments; and
98
{b) action to be taken by the two Governments to ensure the continued
application of international rights and obligations affecting Hong Kong.
5. The two Governments have agreed that in the second half of the period
between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 there will
be need for closer cooperation, which will therefore be intensified during that
period. Matters for consideration during this second period shall include:
(a) procedures to be adopted for the smooth transition in 1997;
(b) action to assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to
maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude
agreements on these matters with states, regions and relevant interna-
tional organisations.
6. The Joint Liaison Group shall be an organ for liaison and not an organ of
power. It shall play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. Nor shall it have any supervisory role
over that administration The members and supporting staff of the Joint Liaison
Group shall only conduct activities within the scope of the functions of the Joint
Liaison Group.
7. Each side shall designate a senior representative, who shall be of Ambass-
adorial rank, and lour other members of the group. Each side may send up to
20 supporting stafT.
8. The Joint Liaison Group shall be established on the entry into force of the
Joint Declaration. From 1 July 1^88 the Joint Liaison Group shall have its
principal base in Hong Kong. The Joint Liaison Group shall continue its work
until I January 2000.
9. The Joint Liaison Group shall meet in Beijing, London and Hong Kong. It
shall meet at least once in each of the three locations in each year. The venue for
each meeting shall be agreed between the two sides.
10. Members of the Joint Liaison Group shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities as appropriate when in the three locations. Proceedings oi the Joint
Liaison Group shall remain confidential unless otherwise agreed between the
two sides.
1 1. The Joint Liaison Group may by agreement between the two sides decide to
set up specialist sub-groups to deal with particular subjects requiring expert
assistance.
12. Meetings of the Joint Liaison Group and sub-groups may be attended by
experts other than the members of the Joint Liaison Group. Each side shall
determine the composition of its delegation to particular meetings of the Joint
Liaison Group or sub-group in accordance with the subjects to be discussed and
the venue chosen.
13. The working procedures of the Joint Liaison Group shall be discussed and




The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's
Republic of China have agreed that, with effect from the entry into force of the
Joint Declaration, land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters shall be
dealt with in accordance with the following provisions:
1. All leases of land granted or decided upon before the entry into force of the
Joint Declaration and those granted thereafter in accordance with paragraph
2 or 3 of this Annex, and which extend beyond 30 June 1997, and all rights in
relation to such leases shall continue to be recognised and protected under the
law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
2. All leases of land granted by the British Hong Kong Government not
containing a right of renewal that expire before 30 June 1997, except short term
tenancies and leases for special purposes, may be extended if the lessee so wishes
for a period expiring not later than 30 June 2047 without payment of an
additional premium. An annual rent shall be charged from the date of extension
equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at that date,
adjusted in step with any changes in the rateable value thereafter. In the case of
old schedule lots, village lots, small houses and similar rural holdings, where the
property was on 30 June 1984 held by, or, in the case of small houses granted
after that date, the property is granted to. a person descended through the male
line from a person who was in 1898 a resident of an established village in Hong
Kong, the rent shall remain unchanged bO long as the property is held by that
person or by one of his lawful successors in the male line. Where leases of land
not having a right ol renewal expire after 30 June 19^7. they shall be dealt with
in accordance with the relevant land laws and policies of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
3. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, new
leases of land may be granted by the British Hong Kong Government for terms
expiring not later than 30 June 2047. Such leases shall be granted at a premium
and nominal rental until 30 June 1997, after which date they shall not require
payment of an additional premium but an annual rent equivalent to 3 per cent
of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with changes
in the rateable value thereafter, shall be charged.
4. The total amount of new land to be granted under paragraph 3 of this Annex
shall be limited to 50 hectares a year (excluding land to be granted to the Hong
Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing) from the entry into force of
the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997.
5. Modifications of the conditions specified in leases granted by the British
Hong Kong Government may continue to be granted before 1 July 1997 at a
premium equivalent to the dittercnce between the value of the land under the
previous conditions and its value under the modified conditions.
6. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997,
premium income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government from land
transactions shall, after deduction of the average cost of land production, be
shared equally between the British Hong Kong Government and the future
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. All the income
obtained by the British Hong Kong Government, including the amount of the
above mentioned deduction, shall be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund
for the financing o\' land development and public works in Hong Kong. The
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Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of the premium
income shall be deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong and shall not be
drawn on except for the financing of land development and public works in
Hong Kong in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7(J) of this Annex.
7. A Land Commission shall be established in Hong Kong immediately upon
the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. The Land Commission shall be
composed of an equal number of officials designated respectively by the
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's
Republic of China together with necessary supporting staff. The officials of the
two sides shall be responsible to their respective governments. The Land
Commission shall be dissolved on 30 June 1997.
The terms of reference of the Land Commision shall be:
(a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of this Annex;
(b) to monitor observance of the limit specified in paragraph 4 of this
Annex, the amount of land granted to the Hong Kong Housing
Authority for public rental housing, and the division and use of premium
income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex;
(c) to consider and decide on proposals from the British Hong Kong
Government for increasing the limit referred to in paragraph 4 of this
Annex;
(J) to examine proposals for drawing on the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region Government's share of premium income referred to in
paragraph 6 of this Annex and to make recommendations to the Chinese
side for decision.
Matters on which there is disagreement in the Land Commission shall be
referred to the CJovernment of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People's Republic of China for decision
8. Specific details regarding the establishment of the Land Commission shall be
finalised separately by the two sides through consultations.
EXCHANGE OF MEMORANDA
(A) UNITED KINGDOM MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM
In connection with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People's Republic of China on the question of Hong Kong to be signed this
day, the Government of the United Kingdom declares that, subject to the
completion of the necessary amendments to the relevant United Kingdom
legislation:
(a) All persons who on 30 June 1997 are, by virtue of a connection with
Hong Kong, British Dependent Territories citizens (BDTCs) under the
law in force in the United Kingdom will cease to be BDTCs with elfect
Irom I July 1997. but will be eligible to retain an appropriate status
which, without conferring the right of abode in the United Kingdom,
will entitle them to continue to use passports issued by the Government
of the United Kingdom. This status will be acquired by such persons
only if they hold or are included in such a British passport issued before
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I July 1997. except thai eligible persons born on or after I January 1997
but before I July 1997 may obtain or be included in such a passport up
to 31 December' 1 997.
(h) No person will acquire BDTC status on or after I July 1997 by virtue
of a connection with Hong Kong. No person born on or after 1 July
19^7 will acquire the status referred to as being appropriate in sub-
paragraph (a).
(< ) United Kingdom consular officials in the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region and elsewhere may renew and replace passports of
persons mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and may also issue them to
persons, born before I July 1497 of such persons, who had previously
been included in the passport of their parent.
(d) Those who have obtained or been included in passports issued by the
Government o\ the United Kingdom under sub-paragraphs iu) and (c)
will be entitled to receive, upon request. British consular services and





The Government of the People's Republic of China has received the
memorandum from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland dated 1984.
Under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, all Hong Kong
Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of the "British Dependent
Territories citizens" Passport" or not, are Chinese nationals.
Taking account of the historical background of Hong Kong and its realities,
the competent authorities of the Government of the People's Republic of China
will, with effect from 1 July 1997, permit Chinese nationals in Hong Kong who
were previously called "British Dependent Territories citizens" to use travel
documents issued by the Government o\' the United Kingdom for the purpose
of travelling to other states and regions.
The above Chinese nationals will not be entitled to British consular protection
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of the
People's Republic of China on account of their holding the above-mentioned
British travel documents.
Beijing, 1984.
Source: Great Britain, Foreign Office, Draft Agreement on the
Future of Hong Kong , 26 September 1 984- > pp. 11-33.
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